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Few domestic problems are more intractable, are growing at a
more rapid rate,' and arouse more emotional concern and conflicts
of principle than the welfare situation. 2 Much of the difficulty results
because, unlike automatic age-retirement programs, welfare is a gov-
ernmental program embracing few points of final decision. Once a
welfare claim is initiated, an escalating series of decisions and reviews
on eligibility, amounts, and changed conditions usually follows, con-
tinuing to the claimant's death-and beyond, where there are survi-
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1. Aggregate amounts of federal welfare assistance were 17.6 billion dollars in 1968 and
23.0 billion in 1970; the totals were expected to reach 31.1 billion in 1971. AM. ENTERPRISE
INST., WELFARE REFORM PROPOSALS 12 (Legislative Analysis No. 4, May 17, 1971).
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vors. Our sense of fairness and our egalitarian desire for consistent
decisions in similar cases call for safeguarding each repetitive
decisional stage with procedural due process protections.3 At the
same time, however, these full procedural formalities can produce
administrative and judicial caseloads of near-astronomical propor-
tions.
One of the less-studied developments of the continually growing
problem of welfare-social insurance administration and litigation is
the federally-administered program for disabled workers, depen-
dents, and survivors. The program dates from 19561 and is adminis-
tered by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Social
Security Administration (SSA) as an offshoot of the familiar Old
Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI) program, which provides eligi-
bility for monthly payments upon retirement to workers in employ-
ments covered by the OASI program.5 Both programs are linked to
payroll deductions and are popularly called "social security." In ess-
ence, the disability program simply advances the date of eligibility for
payments if the worker can show total disability preventing any gain-
ful employment, thus adding to the basic OASI program the concept
of premature, involuntary retirement.'
Arising from concern over the compound problems caused by the
large, steadily increasing volume of disability claims and the diffi-
culty of disability determinations, this article empirically describes
the existing disability program, critically examines the present
determination process, and proposes alternatives designed to alleviate
a number of the current problems.
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
By fiscal year 1970 the steadily rising intake of worker disability
3. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-66 (1970).
4. See Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, tit. I, § 103(a), 70 Stat. 815-17
(1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1970).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-18 (1970) (originally enacted as Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531,
49 Stat. 620). More than 92% of all workers in paid employment are covered. S. LEVITAN, supra
note 2, at 20.
6. Both the regular retirement "insurance" (RSI) and the disability "insurance" (DI) pro-
grams are based on Title II of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-29 (1970). Although
the word "insurance" is a misnomer for both programs despite their semi-contributory nature,
the use of the word does help separate these two wholly federal programs from certain forms
of public assistance provided by the states pursuant to federal grants under other parts of the
Social Security Act. See id. §§ 301-06 (old age assistance and medical assistance for the
aged), §§ 1351-55 (aid to the permanently and totally disabled).
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claims reached 779,926, and the total would have risen to 862,526 if
widow and child claims had been added.7 The hearing examiner corps
utilized to process these claims had grown to approximately 330 in
1971 and is currently the largest in the government.8 Moreover, chal-
lenges to SSA claim denials resulted in an input into the United
States district courts of approximately 1,369 cases in calendar year
1970 and 1,537 in 1971.1 The rate at which claim denials have been
reversed has also been high. By 1970 the reversal rate by hearing
examiners of the 32,000 SSA denials appealed to them was nearly 45
percent.'0 In turn, the reversal rate by federal district courts of hear-
ing examiner denials approached 40 percent."
The total volume of work has been onerous and has tended to
increase each year. For fiscal year 1970, as already noted, almost
800,000 worker disability claims were filed in district offices of the
SSA across the nation; 1971 claims exceeded this total by over
150,000.12 The filing of a claim, however, is only the beginning of the
7. Memorandum, "Selected Data on Claims of Disabled Persons," from Edward L. Binder,
Technical Adviser, Bureau of Disability Insurance (BDI), Social Security Administration
(SSA), to Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Sept. f, 1971.
8. Tabulation, obtained from Charles Dullea, Director, Office of Hearing Examiners, Aug.
23, 1971 (copy on file with author). Indeed, the SSA examiners already comprised more than
50% of the total number of approximately 645 federal hearing examiners. Id. By September,
1972 the SSA Bureau of Hearing Examiners was expected to have 379 permanent hearing
examiners and 43 temporary hearing examiners. Interview with Charles Dullea, August 21,
1972).
9. See note 2 infra.
10. See note 74 infra.
II. See note 92 infra and accompanying text. Reversal rates, which have some bearing on
the question of accuracy and consistency in initial determinations, might be even higher but
for the fact that only denials, not allowances, move up the ladder of reconsideration and review.
Neither hearing examiners nor courts have any opportunity to review and correct errors in the
more than one-half of the administrative level determinations which are allowances rather than
denials.
12. The workload at the four basic administrative stages in fiscal year 1971 was reported
as follows:
Initial Applications Filed 966,000
Initial Applications Processed 953,000
Allowances 395,000
Denials
Substantive (denials based on finding
that applicant not disabled) 364,000
Technical (denials based on failure to meet
a technical requirement, e.g., insured status
requirement not met) 194,000
Reconsideration Processed 128,000
Allowances 48,000
Denials 80,000
Hearings Processed 37,000
Allowances 16,000
Denials 21,000
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administrative process-multiple stages of review significantly in-
crease the agency's burden. Although there are four basic administra-
tive decisional stages in this program-initial consideration, reconsi-
deration, hearing examiner and Appeals Council-dualism between
state and federal agencies at the first two stages produces six levels
of administrative action, which, in addition, may be followed by court
review.' 3
To the basic SSA workload must also be added the "temporary,"
but possibly permanent, program for "black lung" (pneumoconiosis)
disability authorized by Congress at the end of 1969 for the occupa-
tional disease associated with coal mining." The initial congressional
authorization of the black lung disability program contemplated that,
beginning in 1973, the program would cease on a state-by-state basis
as rapidly as states developed federally-approved additions to their
workmen's compensation systems to handle black lung claims. How-
ever, the recent enactment of an 18 month extension of the federal
black lung program, which also increases its scope and the subjectiv-
ity of its standard, 5 seems to indicate that a major federal involve-
Memorandum, "Selected Data on Claims of Disabled Persons," from Edward L. Binder,
Technical Adviser, BDI, SSA, to Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Aug. 16, 1971.
Court action is reported by SSA each calendar year. In 1971, 1,537 new disability cases
were filed. At the end of 1971 the carryover backlog of cases was 2,260, a significant increase
over the 2,001 backlog at the end of calendar year 1970. Figures are derived from 1970-71
Quarterly Reports on SSA Civil Litigation Activity (issued by the Bureau of Retirement and
Survivors Insurance), incorporating data prepared by the Bureau of Disability Insurance.
13. The levels include: (i) initial determination by a state agency team; (2) review of this
action by disability determiners in the Baltimore headquarters of SSA required to complete
the initial determination stage; (3) reconsideration by a state agency team, if requested by a
denied claimant; (4) review of this action by disability determiners in SSA-Baltimore to com-
plete the reconsideration stage; (5) hearing examiner decision if requested by a denied claimant;
(6) SSA Appeals Council discretionary review; (7) review of administrative action by a federal
district court upon appeal by a denied claimant. See the discussion of the disability claims
process, pp. 688-700 infra.
14. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, §§ 401-
26, 83 Stat. 792-98 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-36) (1970). See Knight, Compensation for
Black Lung at the Federal Level: A Precedent for Nationalized Workmen's Compensation, 57
VA. L. REV. 97 (1971) for an overview of the new federal law and a comparison with West
Virginia's workmen's compensation law. The initial figures on filings of black lung claims
exceeded administrative expectations, as did the difficulty in handling the claims. New claims
totalled 256,000 in fiscal year 1971 but were expected to decrease as the initial backlog was
processed. Selected Data (Sept.), supra note 7.
15. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972). The Act
adds strip miners, extends coverage to orphans of miners, expands the definition of disability
to include other respiratory diseases of miners, and bars exclusive use of X-rays for diagnosis.
See generally Hearings on S. 2675, S. 2289, H.R. 9212 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., lst-2d Sess. (1972).
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ment in black lung disability will continue. With the additional black
lung cases, the SSA disability claims intake can be expected to rise
above a million per year, and the number of hearing examiner cases
may rise to 50,000 per year.
Although the number of disability claims subject to administra-
tive adjudication and court litigation has been high, the current vol-
ume may prove to be only the warning tip of an iceberg. If, in addi-
tion to the black lung legislation," Congress enacts the extensive
welfare reforms embodied in H.R. 1, the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1972,1 the combined effect of these two plans, plus the
natural growth rate in the original disability program, will yield
further substantial increases in the number of disability claims filed
with the SSA. Among H.R. l's many proposed reforms is one which
would end the system under the Social Security Act of 193518 of state
administration under federal grant-in-aid programs for the aged, 19 the
blind,"0 and the totally and permanently disabled.21 Under H.R.. 1, the
existing federal-state programs would be replaced with a wholly fed-
eral program22 administered by the SSA through its present adminis-
trative framework and hearing procedures. Through the proposed
basic family assistance concept, eligible individuals would receive
money payments when their monthly income fell below the statutory
levels fixed by Congress.2 Because the standard of eligibility for the
16. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
17. H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See generally HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
REPORT ON H.R. 1, H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Am. ENTERPRISE INST.,
supra note I.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396(g) (1970). See also COMPILATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
LAWS, H.R. Doc. No. 266, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (2 vols. 1968).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1970). The old age assistance provisions should be distinguished
from the wholly federal payroll deduction OASI program. Id. §§ 401-18.
20. Id. §§ 1201-06.
21. Id. §§ 1351-55. The programs for the aged, blind, and totally disabled, along with other
welfare grant-in-aid programs such as aid to maternal and child health services, id. §§ 701-16,
and aid to families with dependent children, id. §§ 601-42, have traditionally been referred
to as categorical relief or public assistance. The federal government provides the money and
some general guidelines, and the states administer the programs. See THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, REPORT 14-24 (Heineman Commission 1969).
22. See the welfare bill as passed by the House, H.R. 1, 92d Cong. 1st Sess., (Social
Security Amendments of 1971), tit. XX (1971), reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. H5660, H5694
(daily ed. June 22, 1971); H. REP. No. 231, supra note 17, at 25.
23. See H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., (Social Security Amendments of 1971), tit.
XXI, §§ 2131-35 (1971) (House Version), reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. H5660, H5701-02
(daily ed. June 22, 1971); H.R. REP. No. 231, supra note 17, at 30-34.
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aged would be 65, and for the blind would be an objective physical
measure,24 neither standard would be expected to produce difficult
administrative determinations or numerous appeals to the hearing
examiner level, although the transfer would increase markedly the
number of claims to be processed through the lower level SSA proce-
dures.25 On the other hand, the standard of eligibility for the trans-
ferred "totally and permanently disabled" program (APTD) would
be the same vague, difficult-to-administer formula which has created
difficulties for the existing SSA disability insurance program-that
is, whether by virtue of a medically ascertainable impairment the
person is unable to perform any type of gainful employment which
exists in meaningful quantity in the region where the individual lives
or in several regions of the national economy.26 Given this standard,
a significant increase in the number of claims which would be ap-
pealed to the SSA hearing examiner level and above might be ex-
pected .27
As welfare caseloads rise, and as the number of administrative
determinations and appeals thus soars, the natural instinct of admin-
istrators is to seek a simpler, more automatic method for delivering
money to eligible welfare recipients. The idea of a guaranteed annual
wage has had perennial appeal, both as a device to fill a gap in the
coverage of existing categories of welfare and as a means of avoiding
detailed, individualized eligibility determinations.28 No such plan,
however, can automatically solve the problems of administrative de-
24. See H.R. i, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., (Social Security Amendments of 1971), tit. XX,
§ 2014(a)(i)(A), (a)(2) (1971) (House version), reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. H5660, H5696
(daily ed. June 22, 1971); H. REP. No. 231, supra note 17, at 26.
25. In fiscal year 1970 there were 2,048,000 old age assistance recipients, and 80,000 blind
recipients. Projected increases for 1971 and 1972 were: old age-2,098,000 and 2,169,000;
blind-83,000 and 84,000. SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, 1972 (Table
L-14) (1971).
26. See H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., (Social Security Amendments of 1971), tit.
XX, § 2014 (a)(3)(A)-(D) (1971) (House version), reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. H5660, H5696
(daily ed. June 22, 1971).
27. In fiscal year 1970 the existing federal-state aid to disabled program (APTD) had
798,000 recipients. Projected totals for 1971 and 1972 were 940,000 and 1,070,000. SPECIAL
ANALYSES, supra note 25. Each of these figures is larger than the total number of disability
insurance claims filed with SSA in 1970. See note 37 infra.
28. The "family assistance plan" concept, which is the informing principle of the Nixon
Administration welfare reform embodied in H.R. 1, has distinct kinship to the concept of a
guaranteed annual wage. It might be argued that expansion of such an assistance plan concept
to the point of replacing the existing "social security" system (OASDI), especially the trouble-
some disability insurance program (DI), if not the basic retirement and survivors insurance
program (RSI) as well, would be advantageous.
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tail, adjudication and litigation which burden our present approach
to welfare. These problems will persist whether welfare benefits are
tied to personal need or to some theory of legal entitlement similar
to the theories underlying the retirement and disability insurance
programs. So long as persons are not free to help themselves from
the "common warehouse," limited only by their own conscience and
self-discipline, and instead, some limits of eligibility and amount are
to be imposed upon them, time-consuming administrative problems
will remain.29
Adding eligibility criteria of need or ability to work, which are
much less objective than the simpler standards of age, period of work
or even capacity to perform one's last job, invites differences in per-
ception and interpretation and provides the distinct possibility of
varying decisions on similar facts. Thus, in the interest of fairness and
equality, hearings and appeals are instituted, and the welfare re-
cipient, in his economic life, almost unavoidably tends to become a
"federal case." A level of fairness, equality of treatment, and
"correctness" of decision which would be unmanageable in the pri-
vate sphere 0 is sought-indeed, is constitutionally mandated be-
cause "state action" is involved. The long range question is at what
point of volume and complexity a high level of decisional formal-
ity and review of each resource allocation determination becomes
unworkable in the welfare system because decisions on claims can-
not be produced with sufficient speed, fairness and consistency.
The SSA disability insurance program is an interesting example of
the way discretionary welfare programs posing difficult eligibility
29. The reason why, despite its large size, the original, wholly federal program (excluding
the disability concept added in 1956) has not become an administrative monstrosity or a cause
of burdensome litigation is because of its simplicity of concept and standards. Because there is
neither a flexible eligibility standard nor an adjustment to need, no extraordinary difficulty in
interpreting facts arises-payments fixed by statute are to be awarded to persons who have
worked for the specified time period in an employment covered by the Act and have reached
the statutory age. By contrast, in SSA's disability program the key concept is "workabil-
ity"-that is, the claimant's theoretical capacity to perform any kind of gainful employment
which exists in significant quantity in the national economy. This standard is far more elusive
than the occupational disability concept common in private insurance. See pp. 700-09 infra.
30. Yet, viewed as an allocation of resources and rewards system, welfare systems do
perform many of the same functions and make many of the same decisions which constantly
recur in private employment-for example, in hiring, pay level, vocational training, work
assignment, retention, promotion, transfer. For the employed, however, market forces with
some contractual overlay make all of the key allocation decisions. The question of fair or equal
treatment is seldom raised or made subject to formal protest and review.
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determinations can acquire an escalating series of administrative
and adjudicatory problems which have no ready solution so long
as standards for deciding a large number of claims remain vague.
PROCESSING DISABILITY CLAIMS
3 1
Claims Intake
Disability claims are filed by a claimant or his representative in
one of the approximately 800 SSA district offices or sub-branches.
The primary function of the district office-which has no decisional
authority-is to perform an intake interview and to marshal the
claimant's OASI earnings data to determine technical eligibility.
Until 1971 the district office, in addition, obtained from the claimant
and his physicians the relevant medical evidence of disability and job
fitness.32 However, the establishment in 1971 of a new procedure
termed "simultaneous development" has transferred the responsibil-
ity for compiling the medical data from the district office to the state
agency. Now, after the district office has obtained the names of the
claimant's physicians, and while it is completing the non-medical file,
the state agency gathers the medical data from the identified sources.
Through placing the state decisional body in control from the outset,
the new procedure is designed to expedite the gathering of complete
medical information and to avoid extensive contacts with physi-
cians.?
The determination of disability may actually begin at the district
office level when the claims representative records his personal obser-
vations of the claimant on the intake interview form. These
31. Much of the factual material in this section concerning the processing up to the hearing
examiner stage is derived from interviews in the summer of 1970 with Samuel E. Crouch,
Deputy Director, Bureau of Disability Insurance; Carl Hall, Assistant Director, Division of
Operations; and Edward J. O'Brien, Assistant Director, Division of Disability Policy and
Procedure.
32. Providing medical data was (and still is) the responsibility of the claimant, but under
the pre-1971 procedure he could receive considerable advice and assistance from the claim
representative in the district office. The district office would hold the file until all medical
reports were received and then forward the file to the state agency. The forms accumulated at
this level included: (k) claimant's application; (2) report of disability interviews; (3) a medical
development summary; (4) a summary of claimant's work activity; (5) release of hospital
records; (6) requests for reports from attending physicians on the impairment.
33. Under the former procedure the decisional body-the state agency-might have sent
the file back to the district office for further medical development if the initial medical reports
were incomplete or unclear.
[Vol. 1972:681
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observations, which are not communicated to the claimant, may
stand uncontradicted through the reconsideration stage.34 Moreover,
the intake interview may be the first and only face-to-face contact
between the claimant and a representative of SSA.35
Approximately 15-20 percent of the claims filed in district offices
fail at the outset for nonsubstantive, technical reasons (for example,
failure to meet insured status requirements)" and are sent directly
to SSA-Baltimore headquarters for verification and official denial.
Although included in the total denial figures for the initial determina-
tion stage, these cases are not referred to state agencies. State agency
workloads at the initial determination stage, therefore, will normally
be 15-20 percent smaller than the total claims intake.37
After a case has left the district office, the file remains open for
additional information concerning the initial disability date claimed.
It also remains open under the continuing claim or "floating applica-
tion" concept, whereby a valid claim may be filed if disability has
occurred by the date of a given decisional stage, even though it did
not exist at the earliest date claimed.3 8 Therefore, the file may return
to the district office several times for updating.
34. See I G. GOLDSBOROUGH, W. TINSLEY, A. STERNBERG, THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION: AN INTER-DIsCIPLINARY STUDY OF DISABILITY EVALUATION 170 (3 vols.
1963) (unpublished report contracted through Geo. Wash. Univ., on file with SSA-Baltimore).
The two administrative stages after the district office-initial determination and reconsidera-
tion-are based on the record only, although pilot programs experimenting with state agency
confrontation with the claimant at the initial consideration stage are now being conducted.
35. Early face-to-face contact at a decisional stage may be one way to reduce the volume
of appeals and the rate of reversal at the hearing examiner stage. See text following note 124
infra. However, the district office activity is not a decisional stage, nor would it seem feasible
to make it a decisional stage because of the intake volume, the number of offices to be
supervised, and the recently reinforced tradition of state agency action.
36. 1970 Interviews, supra note 31.
37. Tabulations of total worker disability claims intake for fiscal years 1969-1972 are:
1969 716,215
1970 779,926
1971 966,000
1972 (est.) 1,175,000
Selected Data (Aug. & Sept.), supra notes 7, 12.
The disability intake figures reported in the United States Budget, which apparently include
dependents' claims, are substantially higher:
1969 1,064,640
1970 1,152,125
1971 1,384,444
1972 (est.) 1,435,000
THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1971-APPENDIX 445; id.
1972-APPENDIX 473; id. 1973-APPENDIX 463.
Disability benefit payment outlays reported in the budget are:
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Initial Determination-State Agency Role
When the district office file is complete, it is sent to the state
agency in the claimant's home state, provided the claim has not been
denied on technical grounds.39 Under the "simultaneous develop-
ment" procedure the state agency will already have been at work
compiling the medical data. Usually, the "state agency" consists of
a vocational rehabilitation agency with which the SSA has contracted
for the performance of initial disability evaluations." A two-man
team, consisting of a physician and an official trained in disability
evaluation, makes the disability determination4 and prepares a
short, written decision which becomes part of the basic file; however,
the result is not communicated to the claimant at this stage.4"
1970 1971 1972 (est.)
Disability beneficiaries in current pay
status (average for year) 2,495,000 2,666,000 2,922,000
Disability benefit payments (in
millions) $ 2,778 $3,381 $3,961
THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1972-APPENDix 473; id.
1973-APPENDIX 463.
38. 1970 Interviews, supra note 31.
39. See text accompanying note 36 supra. The propriety of referring every disability claim
to a state agency may be questioned. Approximately half of the total claims can be disposed
of on the basis of objective medical evidence furnished by the claimant's physician alone. 1970
Interviews, supra note 31. However, a 1965 proposal to eliminate state agency referrals in
"obvious" cases was rejected, the states viewing it as a threat to their status. The 1971 "simulta-
neous development" policy takes the opposite stance, centering the initial medical "work-up"
in the state agencies.
40. For this purpose the state agency is 100% federally funded and operateb under SSA
guidelines on disability determinations.
41. If additional evidence is deemed to be needed, there may be a consultative medical
examination. The examination is performed, not by the physician member of the disability
determination team, but by a private physician drawn from a federally-subsidized roster of
physicians attached to the state agency. As a condition of maintaining his claim, the claimant
must submit to a consultative examination if requested, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (1970); 20
C.F.R. § 1527 (1971), and also must accept vocational rehabilitation efforts if offered, 42
U.S.C. § 422(b) (1970).
42. The statistics for state agency initial determination action in fiscal years 1969-70 are:
1969 1970
Total referrals 642,057 603,329
Allowances 359,617 330,208
Denials 282,440 273,120
Selected Data (Sept.), supra note 7.
For discussion of the standards upon which the state agency's initial determination is based,
see pp. 700-09 infra.
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Initial Determination-SSA -Baltimore Role
The state agency decision and the claimant's file are sent to the
Bureau of Disability Insurance (BDI) in the SSA-Baltimore head-
quarters for review by disability determiners4 3 with the aid of medi-
cal specialists who are available for advice.4 The degree of finality
accorded the state agency decision depends on whether the state de-
terminers have approved or denied the claim. A recommended ap-
proval of a disability claim can be rejected by BDI. On the other
hand, a state agency's denial of a claim cannot be reversed directly,45
although the denial may be remanded with a recommendation that
the state agency change its decision." Thus, on its own, BDI may not
be more lenient than the state agency; however, it -can be stricter,
either by reversing an award or by limiting the period of eligibility
through a finding that disability did not begin until later than the date
fixed by the state agency or that disability ceased prior to an ending
date determined by the agency.47
43. There are approximately 700 disability determiners, about 10% having law degrees. As
of 1970, nearly 500 were involved in review of state agency initial decisions. Another 200 were
engaged in review of reconsideration actions. 1970 Interviews, supra note 31. Newly expanded
sampling techniques, which provide for actual review of less than 10% of the state agency
decisions, allow determiners more time for concentration on difficult cases and on reconsidera-
tion actions. Interviews with Samuel E. Crouch, Deputy Director, BDI, SSA, Dec. 2-3, 1971.
44. The standards for decision are the same at the state agency and the Baltimore levels.
See notes 120-25 infra and accompanying text. Although training sessions are held, the volume
of decisions and the rule of confidentiality have precluded recording and indexing of precedents
at either level. For discussion of the level of consistency in the decision-making process, see
pp. 709-22 infra.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1970) (providing SSA "own motion" review only where the
state agency determines that an individual is disabled).
46. Id.
47. The figures for BDI workload and dispositive action at the initial determination stage
for fiscal year 1970 before initiation of the new sampling technique were:
Total initial applications processed 769,343
Technical denials without referral to
state agency 158,000
State substantive denials changed to
allowances after negotiation 5,422
Total substantive denials 273,120
State substantive allowances changed to denials
by negotiation rather than outright reversal 6,204
Total allowances 330,208
Selected Data (Sept.), supra note 7. Several thousand claims, such as foreign and railroad
claims, which are not processed by state agencies even if technical requirements are met, should
be added to the above figures. It may be noted that the figures for initial applications filed in a
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Although until recently all state agency decisions were reviewed,48
by early 1972 BDI had reduced review by its disability determiners
to a 5 percent sampling of the state agency determinations. In addi-
tion to this basic 5 percent sample, there is an independent 2 percent
sample by the medical staff which is designed to provide a continuing
review of the efficacy of the medical guidelines49 and can also affect
the decision in the cases reviewed. Finally, there is a 1 percent sample
which monitors the whole program for administrative efficiency but
does not affect the decision. The reduced number of claims now
reviewed on their merits (BDI does control technical entitlement
questions so that all state allowances do require a perfecting BDI
decision) necessarily yields fewer occasions to return a state denial
for negotiation or to reverse an allowance outright. Thus, the sam-
pling practice makes the state agency decision the effective initial
determination for most claims.
Allowances approved by BDI are final at this stage. Denials are
recorded on a form showing the reasons for the decision, but an
extensive rationale is not prepared; instead, a standard letter of
denial is sent to the claimant." The initial determination stage per-
forms a valuable "flush" function in reducing the burdensome case-
load to more manageable proportions through the expeditious
rejection of meritless or technically defective claims5 and the
ready allowance of "hardcore" disability claims.
Reconsideration Determination-State Agency and SSA-Baltimore
If the initial determination stage culminates in a denial,5 the
given year and initial applications processed in a given year will never be the same, because of
necessary lag in processing time. For fiscal year 1970 the number of initial applications filed
was 862,526. Id.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1970) (which authorizes but does not require SSA review of
state agency allowances, and implicitly withholds power to reverse a state agency denial).
49. Approximately half of the cases referred to state agencies and returned to BDI in the
initial determination stage are disposed of under an objective medical-clinical approach. This
wholly medical approach presumes disability if certain medically verifiable impairments are
present. Cases in this category might be termed "hard-core disability" and seldom present
decisional problems which require appeal. Selected Data (Sept.), supra note 7; 1970 Interviews,
supra note 3 1. See notes 104-10 infra and accompanying text (describing the objective medical
approach).
50. 20 C.F.R. § 404.907 (1971).
51. Examples of technically defective claims include those which are based on a work
record insufficient to establish potential eligibility and those which are meritless in a disability
sense because the claimant simply is unemployed and has the "miseries." 1970 Interviews,
supra note 31.
52. Allowances at the initial consideration stage receive no further review, a factor which
must be borne in mind in assessing reversal rates and measures of consistency.
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claimant must request a reconsideration within six months or the
denial becomes final.5 3 A claimant's request initiates the reconsider-
ation process, and the state agency-BDI determination procedure is
repeated. 4 The second two-level examination of a claim is more de-
liberate-all cases are reprocessed by the state agencies, and all state
agency redeterminations are substantively reviewed by BDI. 5
The first step in the reconsideration process is the updating of the
file by the district office. At this point the claimant may have an
interview55 and submit additional medical evidence. Often, he will
choose a new physician or consult specialists and thus present a
stronger case than at the initial determination stage.57 The second
step is review of the file by the state agency, normally with a fresh
team of determiners. After a decision by the state agency, the file is
again forwarded to SSA-Baltimore for the third step in the reconsi-
deration process. BDI may reverse a state agency decision to allow a
formerly denied claim but can only send the claim back to the agency
with a recommendation for an allowance if, upon reconsideration, the
agency has upheld an initial determination of denial.58
53. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.908, .911 (1971).
54. See, id. § 404.914. The reconsideration stage is not specified by statute but is authorized
by SSA regulations to give the claimant, the state agency and SSA a chance to correct
erroneous denials at this level and thus to avoid the delay and expense of a hearing examiner
proceeding.
55. There is no sampling technique at reconsideration (as of early 1972). The median time
lapse from initial denial to request for reconsideration is 31 days. The claim is reviewed by fresh
personnel in most instances. In terms of processing time, the median time from application to
initial denial is 52 days, but from request for reconsideration to reconsideration decision, it is
62 days, despite the sharply reduced volume at the latter stage. Memorandum from Samuel E.
Crouch, Deputy Director, BDI, SSA to Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Nov. 6, 1970.
56. Except for the district office interview, which is not a decisional stage, the regulations
provide no face-to-face contact with the claimant at the reconsideration level.
57. For the mass of cases handled in the initial determination stage, time limitations inhibit
the use of consultative physicians, especially specialists such as psychiatrists. However, upon
reconsideration, in some cases the file built by the family physician will be augmented for the
first time by an examination by a consultative physician. Hence, although in theory all of the
cases in which allowances can rest solely on medical considerations should be eliminated during
the initial determination stage (leaving for the reconsideration stage only those cases where the
undecided factor is the subtle vocational element), many of the reversals at this stage (about
one-third) rest more on medical factors than on vocational factors. 1970 Interviews, supra note
31.
58. The figures for BDI workloads and dispositive action at the reconsideration level for
fiscal year 1970 are:
Total reconsiderations processed 109,453
Allowances 33,474
Denials 61,232
Selected Data (Sept.), supra note 7.
The open file-continuing claim concept complicates assessment of these figures. The allow-
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Hearing Examiner Stage
Claimants who fail to receive a disability allowance at the reconsi-
deration stage have six months from the date that notice of denial is
mailed to file a request for a hearing before an examiner attached to
SSA's Bureau of Hearings and Appeals.59 When a requestfor-&-hear-
ing is made, the claimant's files are transferred to the hearing exam-
iner stationed in the area in which the claimant resides, and that
examiner must schedule a hearing at a place as close as possible to
the claimant's residence. In contrast with the two prior decisional
stages, the claimant has a right to appear personally at the hearing."
In addition, he may be represented by retained counsel, although this
right"' is infrequently exercised in practice."2 Unless the claimant au-
thorizes a decision based solely on the written evidence, 3 the exam-
iner holds a hearing at a location within 75 miles of the claimant's
residence after a minimum of ten days notice. 4
Although the hearing is nonadversary, it is formal in the sense
that a complete record is made 5 and both the hearing examiner and
the claimant may subpoena and question witnesses under oath.6" The
hearing examiner has great latitude in the manner in which he con-
ducts the hearing. New evidence is freely admitted under the open
ance of disability at the reconsideration stage may be based on new medical evidence or
interpretations not available at the initial determination stage. Thus, because some second
determinations, although technically classed as reversals, are really de novo, the open file-
continuing claim concept operates to inflate the reversal rate. Moreover, this same factor
inflates the reversal rate at all succeeding levels of review. It has been estimated that the
reported reversal rates should be reduced by 10-15% to account for this inflationary factor. 1970
Interviews (Samuel E. Crouch), supra note 31.
59. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.917-18 (1971). The Bureau, which also contains the Appeals Council,
is located in Arlington, Virginia, thus necessitating transfer of files between Baltimore and the
Washington area for cases which proceed above the reconsideration level.
60. Id. § 404.919.
61. Id. § 404.971.
62. In 1964-65, attorneys represented claimants in approximately 17-18% of the hearings.
In the first six months of 1971, the number approached 21-23%. Figures obtained from Edward
L. Binder, Technical Adviser, Bureau of Disability Insurance, SSA-Baltimore Headquarters,
August 1971. The right to retained counsel is available at prior decisional stages, but cases in
which it is exercised are rare. 1970 Interviews, supra note 31.
63. 20 C.F.R. § 404.934 (1971).
64. Id. § 404.923; SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK § 2008, at 332 (4th ed. 1969).
65. 20 C.F.R. § 404.931 (1971).
66. Id. §§ 404.926, .929. Formal rules of evidence do not apply. Id. § 404.928. The con-
duct of the hearing is deemed to satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act as well as the Social
Security Act. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 408-10 (1971). See discussion at notes 244-
56 infra and accompanying text.
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file-continuing claim concept.17 Moreover, at any time between the
request for hearing and the mailing of the decision, the hearing exam-
iner, on his own motion or by the request of a party, and subject to
appropriate notice, may "consider any specified new issue. . . even
though the Administration has not made an initial and reconsidered
determination with respect to such new issue ... ."I' The typical
hearing is quite informal with only the hearing examiner, the claim-
ant, and a transcriber required to be present. 9 The hearing examiner
may request a vocational specialist and a medical adviser to attend
the hearing; after reviewing the file and observing the- claimant's
demeanor at the hearing, these experts may provide assistance in
assessing the claimant's capacity for employment. 70
In keeping with the non-adversary nature of the proceeding, the
role of the SSA hearing examiner is multi-faceted and dominant.71
In the usual case in which the claimant does not retain an attorney,
the examiner functions as claimant's de facto counsel, striving to fully
develop the case from the complainant's point of view. He is the first
person with decisional authority to confront the claimant personally
and elicit a connected account of his difficulties. 7 Because there is no
"defense counsel" to protect federal tax resources, the examiner also
functions as government spokesman. His concern is to expose incon-
sistencies, gaps in the record, lack of claimant credibility, and to
honor the statutory command that the claimant carry the burden of
67. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
68. 20 C.F.R. § 404.924 (1971).
69. See id. §§ 404.919, .93 1.
70. See id. § 404.927. Each will have received relevant portions of the file, but neither will
have examined the claimant prior to the hearing. A strong-willed medical adviser can support
a conclusion of disability in such clear terms that a hearing examiner will have little choice but
to concur or face an appeal. On the other hand, from the standpoint of avoiding reversal on
appeal, the best ally that a hearing examiner can have is a forthright medical adviser who
provides a clear statement supporting either a finding of. disability or denial on which the
examiner can base his own decision.
71. The non-adversary hearing is an atypical form of administrative adjudication. More-
over, many hearing examiners reversals of prior agency decisions represent a perfection of the
administrative process rather than adjudication. Several contingencies may result in thes6
overrulings: (I) the claimant's condition may degenerate (under the "open-file" rule, this dec-
line is considered by the examiner); (2) new evidence concerning the initially claimed condition
may become available; or (3) the examiner may reverse an erroneous state agency denial which
BDI lacked power to overturn. See Comments of John Porterfield, President, Ass'n of Hearing
Examiners, HEW, on SSA Disability Study at 12, 14, 16 (filed Nov. 23, 1971 with the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States).
72. The claimant normally will not have exercised his right to file a written brief. 20
C.F.R. § 404.930 (1971). Moreover, although the record contains much discrete information,
there is no written narrative account from the claimant's point of view.
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proving disability. 73 Further, in his quasi-judicial role the hearing
examiner has decisional authority under the law embodied in SSA
regulations, rulings and current practice. On the one hand, the
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (1970).
74. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.939, .940 (1971). These aspects of the SSA policy-making process
are discussed at notes 102-26 infra and accompanying text.
In fiscal year 1970, 32,000 hearings were processed, resulting in 14,000 allowances (reversals
of administrative denials) and 18,000 denials (affirmances of administrative denials)-a reversal
rate of 44%. Even more striking is the tabulation of reversals by hearing examiners from 1958-
70 of disability appeals and total appeals, that is, disability plus retirement, and, since 1965,
medicare claims. Disability claims, excluding "black lung," average approximately 85% of the
total number of appeals. The figures are:
HEARING EXAMINER RATE OF REVERSALS OF SSA ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATIONS
Reversals of
Total Appealed to HE
41.6%
38.2%
38.8%
39.5%
37.7%
28.9%
28.3%
21.1%
19.8%
22.8%
15.2%
11.0%
8.4%
Reversals of
Disability Appealed to HE
44.4%
40.3%
40.4%
41.2%
38.7%
29.8%
29.0%
20.4%
19.0%
21.8%
13.9%
9.0%
4.1%
Tabulation furnished by Carlile Bolton-Smith, Assistant to the Bureau Director for Liaison,
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, SSA, Nov. 6, 1970 (copy on file with author).
Hearing examiner lag data for fiscal year 1970 show that the national median elapsed days
from date hearing requested to disposition was 112 days. Management Effectiveness Report,
furnished by office of Carlile Bolton-Smith, Assistant to the Bureau Director for Liaison,
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, SSA (Sept. 1, 1971) (copy on file with author).
Total hearing examiner workload and case disposition for recent fiscal years is:
All Requests for Hearing
Hearing Requests Processed
Affirmances (denial not changed)
Reversals (allowances)
Dismissals
Disability Cases as % of All
Requests for Hearing
1960
13,778
20,262
12,788
3,076
4,398
1965
23,323
23,393
14,578
6,754
2,061
1969
34,244
31,912
16,789
12,206
2,917
1970
42,573
38,480
18,542
16,005
3,933
1971
50,101
45,301
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
71% 87% 82% 82% 81%
Briefing Pamphlet for Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (1970) (as updated) (unpublished, on
file with SSA Bureau of Hearings and Appeals); supplementary material furnished by Roger
Gentsch, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals.
Fiscal Year
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
[Vol. 1972:681
DISABILITY CLAIMS
quasi-judicial concept points in the direction of examiner independ-
ence from institutional pressures other than the formal appeal process
itself. On the other hand, except in the "hardcore" disability cases
which normally would not reach this stage, the multiplicity of factors
and the subjectivity of the standard that are involved in a disability
determination at this level may call for an institutional decision.75
75. The question of hearing examiner independence was the subject of comment in the
"Horsky Report" in 1961. C. Horsky & A. Mahin, The Operation of the Social Security
Administration, Hearing and -Decisional Machinery (1960) (unpublished and on file with the
Administrative Conference of the United States). Although critical of some SSA practices-for
example, ex parte communications between hearing examiners and medical advisors, id. at 410-
19, a practice no longer followed-the Horsky Report was extremely sensitive to the need for
frequent communications of many kinds to hearing examiners concerning agency policy. Id.
at 382-83. Various memoranda, sent to the hearing examiners by the program division, which
set forth legal or policy determinations were not seriously questioned. Id. at 394-95. The
Horsky Report took a position more liberal in this area than did responsible officials inside
SSA itself. Memorandum from Harold P. Packer, Assistant General Counsel, HEW, to Har-
old W. Horowitz, Associate General Counsel, HEW, August 7, 1971 (on file with the
Administrative Conference of the United States). The House Subcommittee on the Administra-
tion of the Social Security Laws, in addition to questioning certain communications between
SSA and the hearing examiners, objected to examiner "production quotas." SUBCOMM. ON
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY LAWS, 86TH CONG., 2d SESS., PRELIMINARY RE-
PORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF SSA DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 37 (Comm. Print 1960).
The matter of hearing examiner independence has recently been raised again in a report
recommending that the Section on Administrative Law of the American Bar Association call
upon the ABA to institute a thorough study of SSA hearing examiner independence. J. Gam-
mon, Hearing Examiners Subcommittee Report on Social Security Administration, reprinted
in 7 ABA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SECTION 25 (1970). The report quotes a comment of Judge
Thomas F. McAllister, Senior Judge, Sixth Circuit, complaining about hearing examiner disre-
gard of disability rulings of that circuit. Id. at 26. A response to the Gammon Report in an
SSA position paper notes the inappropriateness of the quotation from Judge McAllister which
was made prior to the 1967 Amendments to the Social Security Act when SSA was resisting
the tendency of many courts to apply a more liberal standard of disability than Congress had
intended. Letter from Charles M. Erisman, Acting Director of Bureau of Hearings and Ap-
peals, to Dan M. Byrd, Jr., Chairman, ABA Section of Administrative Law, April 6, 1970 (on
file with Administrative Conference of the United States). For discussion of the 1967 Amend-
ments and the conflict which led to their enactment, see notes 96-101 infra and accompanying
text.
76. Appeals Council total workload figures for recent years (80-85% constituting disability
cases) are:
1960 1965 1969 1970
Total cases received 7,408 8,785 10,038 11,269
Total cases processed 8,386 8,320 10,104 11,094
Total affirmances 435 710 769 769
Total reversals 300 797 999 1,380
Total substantive decisions 735 1,507 1,768 2,149
Memorandum from Carlile Bolton-Smith, Assistant to the Bureau Director for Liason, Bureau
of Hearings and Appeals, SSA to Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Sept. 1, 1971.
The projected total workload for fiscal year 1972 is 16,899 cases received. Briefing Pamphlet
Vol. 1972:681]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Appeals Council Stage
The Appeals Council is the reviewing authority which stands at
the apex of the administrative structure for processing disability
claims.76 A claim normally reaches the Appeals Council in one of
three ways: (1) the Council may remove a hearing request which is
pending before a hearing examiner and conduct the proceeding it-
self;77 (2) , hearing examiner may decline to decide a case and certify
it to the Council with a recommended decision; 8 or (3) a claimant
may appeal a hearing examiner's denial of disability.79 In addition,
the Appeals Council monitors unappealed hearing examiner decisions
and may recommend modification for "technical errors." The Ap-
peals Council may deny a claimant's request for review'" and does so
in a large majority of cases.8
The Appeals Council usually operates in panels of two members
and may utilize medical and vocational advisers. One of the two
panelists writes an opinion, and if the second concurs, the opinion
becomes an Appeals Council decision. If the second disagrees, an-
other panelist is called in to break the deadlock."
In a removed case, a certified case, or an appeal which leads to
an outright reversal of the examiner's decision, the Council's determi-
for Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (1970) (as updated) (unpublished, on file with SSA Bureau
of Hearings and Appeals). Most of the gap between the large number of cases processed and
the small number of substantive decisions is explained by the fact that review is discretionary
and the Appeals Council frequently denies requests for review. Most of the hearing examiner
decisions reviewed are denials because, normally, only denied claims move up the ladder,
However, through exercise of its "own motion" review, the Appeals Council may reverse an
allowance. See note 77 infra and accompanying text. BHA reports do not indicate the number
of allowances reversed, but the figure is probably low (spokesmen say that the Appeals Council
generally hesitates to reverse an allowance because of the adverse psychological effect of
retracting a benefit already granted to needy persons).
77. 20 C.F.R. § 404.941 (1971). In such a case the hearing is governed by rules applicable
to a hearing examiner hearing. Id.
78. Id. §§ 404.939, .942.
79. Id. § 404.945. Appeal must be made within 60 days. Id. § 404.946. In either a certified
case or an appealed case, evidence in addition to that admitted by the hearing examiner may
be received if the Appeals Council feels that such evidence may affect its decision,
id. §§ 404.943, .949, and the claimant may file briefs and present oral argument,
id. §§ 404.942, .948 (the regulations are unclear on the right to oral argument in an appealed
case, but the right is accorded).
80. Id. §§ 404.947, .951.
81. See note 76 supra.
82. Moreover, when there is disagreement, either original panelist or tie breaker has the
option of asking for an en banc consideration. Letter from Charles M. Erisman, Acting Direc-
tor of Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, to Professor Roger Cramton, April 1, 1970 (on file at
the Administrative Conference of the United States).
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nation simply supersedes the examiner's. However, an appeal may
result not in an affirmance, modification or formal reversal of the
examiner's decision, but in a remand to the examiner with directions
to rehear the case and to issue a decision or to take further testimony
and return the record to the Appeals Council with a recommended
decision. 3 Alternatively, without reversing, the Council may infor-
mally return a case to the examiner, suggesting that there are techni-
cal errors and that the examiner may wish to "correct" his decision.84
Given these various alternatives of contact with the hearing examin-
ers, the line often becomes blurred between formal appellate action
which does not compromise the independence of the hearing exam-
iner and corrective institutional contacts of an informal, revisory
nature.8 5
The decision of the Appeals Council, or the decision of the hear-
ing examiner where the claimant's request for review is denied, is
final unless a civil action is filed in a federal district court.8" Appeals
Council decisions, like the decisions of hearing examiners, are not
published and do not have precedential value.87 Occasionally,
however, a particularly significant case may be elevated to the level
of a Ruling, which does have precedential value. 8
Judicial Review
Within sixty days following a final administrative decision deny-
83. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (1971).
84. In practice, because the Appeals Council does not have a formal operating staff, ana-
lysts in the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals Division of Program Operations routinely review
hearing examiner decisions and recommend to the Council whether its "own motion" review
power should be exercised. Examples of situations where technical corrective action would be
taken include a failure upon receipt of new evidence to reopen and modify a prior decision which
had determined that the current claimant was not disabled, or a mistake in setting the eligibility
date. Interviews with Bureau of Hearings and Appeals Staff, June 1971.
85. For discussion of the hearing examiner/Appeals Council relationship as it affects hear-
ing examiner independence, see note 75 supra and accompanying text.
86. 20 C.F.R. § 404.951 (1971). However, any decision from the initial determination
stage through the Appeals Council stage may be reopened for specified reasons during a period
extending up to four years for "good cause" such as new evidence; moreover, the decision may
be reopened at any time for reasons such as fraud. Id. § 404.957.
87. Primary reasons for not publishing the decisions are (I) the concern for maintaining
confidentiality regarding the personal medical impairments of the claimant and other related
personal matters and (2) the large volume of decisions, which, together with the factual stress
and the brevity of the rationale, would make them of little use as precedents anyway. Most
decisions, based upon a Council reaction to the totality of the often conflicting evidence in the
record and its application of the uncertain congressional standards, are a borderline type not
readily transferable to new fact situations. BHA Interviews, supra note 84.
88. See notes 128-30 infra and accompanying text.
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ing his claim of disability, a claimant may file an appeal with the
United States district court for the district in which he resides or has
his place of business.8 9 The answer, filed by the Secretary of HEW,
must include the evidence upon which the SSA findings and decision
are based. Factual findings of the Administration, if supported by
substantial evidence,9" are conclusive. The court may affirm, modify,
reverse, or remand for a rehearing, and its decision may be appealed
to the court of appeals in the same manner as judgments in other civil
actions. A high rate of judicial reversal of SSA decisions has proba-
bly contributed to the heavy workload of both district courts" and
courts of appeal13 by encouraging disability claimants to appeal. 4
DISABILITY STANDARDS: DEFICIENCIES IN CLARITY AND
CONSISTENCY
The critical problem in the SSA disability program may center
not in the several-tiered administrative determination process, but
89. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970). If he does not reside-or have his principal place of business
within such a judicial district, the claimant may bring an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Id.
90. Id. See notes 235-56 infra and accompanying text (discussing the substantial evidence
rule and its application to SSA findings).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 405(gy (1970). For discussion of the disposition of many courts, particu-
larly prior to the 1967 Amendments, to ignore the substantial evidence rule, to give trials
de novo, and in effect, to convert the disability benefit program into a type of unemployment
compensation system, see pp. 722-32 infra.
92. Statistics indicate the burdensome district court workload:
1968 1969 1970 1971
New disability complaints - 1392 1369 1537
Combined affirmance rate - 60% 62% 62%
Cases awaiting disposition 1440 1772 2001 2260
(Allowances after remand are treated as reversals.) Figures are derived from 1968-72 Quar-
terly Reports on SSA Civil Litigation Activity (issued as memoranda by the Bureau of Re-
tirement and Survivors Insurance).
93. Recent courts of appeal workload figures are:
1969 1970 1971
Affirmed 25 47 65
Reversed 2 2 9
Remanded 10 4 12
Affirmance rate (counting remands 70% 89% 76%
as reversals)
Pending cases 51 78 69
Id.
It must be noted that, while all district court "affirmances" support an SSA denial (because
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rather in the inexactness of the statutory standards, the lack of clarity
and precision' in the rule-making procedures, and the interrela-
tionship of the standards problem with the administrative process.
No study of the existing administrative process for determining disa-
bility claims, with its high rate of reversals, can be meaningful or
productive without emphasizing the problem of standards. Neither
the initial congressional definition of disability nor the redefinition of
1967 seems to be administratively manageable, and the problem of
refining the standard and applying it with clarity and consistency is
aggravated when the courts ignore the substantial evidence rule.1
5
The Statute
The basic standard has always been total disability-the "inabil-
ity to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . 96
Until 1965 this concept was qualified and limited by the requirement
that the disability be one "which can be expected to result in death
or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration."97 However, in
1965 the "duration" requirement was eased to include disability
only denials are appealed), court of appeal affirmances are uninformative unless one knows
whether the district court ruled for or against the SSA denial.
From the inception of the disability program through calendar year 1970, the overall record
for cases in the courts of appeal is: 232 decisions for SSA, 78 against; 84 remanded to SSA;
58 dismissed on technical grounds. Disregarding the dismissals, the combined affirmance ratio
(adding remands to decisions against SSA) is 232 to 162. Id. For the period 1957-70 the
combined federal court review record (district courts and courts of appeal) on the 9940 final
actions (of 7939 complaints filed in the district courts) is: affirmed SSA decision-3724; re-
versed SSA decision-1594; Appeals Council decisions favorable to claimant on re-
mand-1811. Adding remands to reversals, the combined affirmance ratio is 3724 to
3405-only slightly better than 50%. Id.
94. The problem of frequent court review and reversal of SSA hearing examiner decisions
centers in the disability program rather than in the larger OASI retirement program. As
summarized by one observer in 1968: "Prior to the availability of disability benefits, beginning
in 1957 . . . relatively few cases arose from the anonymity of administrative decision. In the
last ten years the volume of litigation has multiplied." Viles, The Social Security Administra-
tion Versus the Lawyers. . . And Poor People Too, 39 Miss. L.J. 371, 390 (1968).
95. Regarding judicial action, the caveat must be added that the record of judicial review
under the 1967 Amendments is insufficient to permit a conclusive evaluation. The recent
Supreme Court case of Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), may reflect a disposition
to respect the relative informality of the SSA hearing procedures-and to adhere more closely
to the substantial evidence rule. See discussion at notes 244-56 infra and accompanying text.
96. See Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, tit. I, § 103(a), 70 Stat. 815 (1956)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2) (1958)), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1970).
97. Id.
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"which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months ...."I'
The administrative regulations defining the disability standard
were intended to carry out the apparent congressional intent that this
program constitute an extraordinary program for the disabled, invol-
untary, premature retiree, and not be merely another species of un-
employment compensation." Thus, SSA attempted to denote certain
objective, hard-core disability areas in order to expedite claims
handling at the initial determination stage and sought to introduce
on a national basis some standardization, objectivity and uniformity
in proceedings on borderline disability claims. The courts, however,
showed a marked tendency in interpreting the statute to convert the
program into a humanitarian unemployment program for any worker
whose unemployment had some demonstrable basis in physical or
mental trauma. The simple fact that there had been some disability
and that the immediate claimant had lost his job or his zest for work
created a near-presumption of a right to "get his tontine now."',"
In 1967 Congress amended and clarified the statute in an attempt
to force the courts to adhere to the basic, narrow, total disability
concept:
98. Social Security Amendments of 1965, tit. III, § 303(a)(2), 79 Stat. 367 (1965),
amending 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2) (1964) (presently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)
(1970)). Legislative history indicates that the change from "indefinite duration" to "12 months"
was made because experience showed that "in the great majority of cases in which total
disability continues for at least a year the disability is essentially permanent." I U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2039 (1965). The change, which clarified and liberalized proof, but
not the total disability concept, was expected to make 60,000 workers and dependents immedi-
ately eligible. Id. at 2040.
99. See HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967,
H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-31 (1967); SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, SOCIAL
SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967, S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., ist Sess. 46-50 (1967). The
Senate report states that "[t]he original provision was designed to provide disability insurance
benefits to workers who are so severely disabled that they are unable to engage in any substan-
tial gainful activity." Id. at 49 (emphasis added). However, the "definition of disability has
eroded over a period of time," resulting in a "significant increase in the proportion of the
population becoming disabled within the definition," although the actual proportion of disabled
persons within the population has not increased. Id. at 47.
100. The report of the House Ways and Means Committee reviewing the problem which
preceded the 1967 Amendments noted that one court had expressed with admirable frankness
the degree of judicial rejection of congressional intent:
The standard which emerges from these decisions in our circuit and elsewhere is a
practical one: whether there is a reasonably firm basis for thinking that this particular
claimant [who has shown inability to perform his usual vocation] can obtain a job within
a reasonably circumscribed labor market. H.R. REP. No. 544, supra note 99, at 29
(1967).
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[A]n individual . . shall be determined to be under a disability only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is
not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gain-
ful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job
vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 101
However, the variables of age, education, and previous work experi-
ence, coupled with often conflicting medical data and uncertainty
concerning claimant's theoretical capacity to adjust to a new, less
demanding line of work, still leave much room for differences of
opinion in similar cases arising under the "clarified" statute.
Regulations
The evaluation standards promulgated by SSA102 which are rel-
evant to disability determination for the mass of general claimants
(workers in fully insured status under the OASI retirement pro-
gram) are contained in a single SSA regulation, section 1502.103
The three tests of disability which seem to emerge from this reg-
ulation form a progression from "hard-core" to "borderline" dis-
ability, and a determiner cannot finally decide to deny a claim until
he has considered all three tests.
Test I, derived from section 1502(a), might be termed an objective
medical approach.104 Section 1502(a) is supplemented by a long medi-
cal appendix listing various types of physical impairments-for
example, loss of both hands, both feet, or one hand and one foot.05
101. Social Security Amendments of 1967, tit. I, pt. 4, § 158(b), 81 Stat. 868, amending
42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2) (1964) (presently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1970)). The
statute adds further definitional detail:
For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), "work which
exists in the national economy" means work which exists in significant numbers either
in the region where such individual lives or in several regions in the country. Id.
[A] "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically ac-
ceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. Id. § 423(d)(3) (1970).
102. The rulemaking power is specifically conferred upon SSA in id. § 405(a).
103. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (1971). The other disability regulations, id. §§ 404.1501, .1503-
39, deal with various matters of detail including the special rules applicable to the blind, widows
and widowers.
104. Id. § 404.1502(a) (beginning at the fourth sentence).
105. See id. § 404.1506; Appendix following id. § 404.1539.
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If a claimant's medical abfiormalities fit a particular category in the
schedule of impairments, his claim is approved without consideration
of his residual work capacity and ability to overcome his impairment.
Hence, section 1502(a) specifies that, on "medical considerations
alone" (absent rebuttal evidence), a claimant can be deemed disabled
"where his impairment is one that meets the duration requirement
• .. [continuous 12 month period] and is listed in the appendix
. . ,"I0 Moreover, an applicant whose defect is not listed may still
be deemed disabled on medical considerations alone if his impair-
ment, or combined impairments, are "medically the equivalent of a
listed impairment."' 0 7
Test I is designed to set up an objective category of hard-core
disability analogous to the widespread, schedular approach employed
in state workmen's compensation systems." 8 Although the objective
medical standard seemingly conflicts with the literal language of the
statute, which calls for assessment of individual residual work capac-
ity in all instances, 09 Congress apparently approves of the
approach." 0 Administratively, Test I supports a vital "flush" process.
Under the test, a large number of the claims filed annually can be
allowed without resort to a face-to-face hearing. To reject Test I and
require further, subjective assessment of each claimant's capacity to
overcome severe handicaps would tend to create added administrative
problems for SSA and at the same time might be disadvantageous
to claimants by increasing the number of imponderable cases and
penalizing individuals possessing strong, work-oriented personalities.
Test II, created by section 1502(c), is a semi-objective standard
which encompasses what may be characterized as the "worn-out"
manual laborer syndrome. An "individual with a marginal education
106. Id. § 404.1502(a).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 279 (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2208 (Supp.
1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1007 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-56 (Supp. 1971).
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1970).
110. Congressional committee reports on the 1967 Amendments seem to endorse the
objective medical approach of Test I. See H.R. REP. No. 544, supra note 99, at 30-31 (1967),
and the following language in the corresponding Senate report: "In most cases the decision that
an individual is disabled can be made solely on the basis of an impairment, or impairments,
which are of a level of severity presumed (under administrative rules) to be sufficient so that,
in the absence of an actual demonstration of ability to engage in substantial gainful activity, it
may be presumed that the person is unable to so engage. ... S. REP. No. 744, supra note
99, at 49 (emphasis added). The amendments were designed to clarify the standards for the
more borderline claims where the impairments were insufficient to qualify for the presumption,
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and long work experience. . limited to the performance of arduous
unskilled physical labor," who is unemployed and unable to perform
his accustomed labor because of a significant impairment or impair-
ments may fall within this classification if, considering his age, educa-
tion and vocational background, he is unable to engage in lighter
work."' The test has special relevance for aged, unemployed coal
miners, but, of course, is not confined to that work category. In Test
II, SSA has recognized that, as a practical matter, such workers are
unwilling to go very far from their established homes or accept re-
training for sedentary jobs, although theoretically they have sufficient
residual capacity to perform some kind of gainful activity which
exists to a significant degree in their home region or in several areas
of the country. Like Test I this criterion conflicts with the literal
language of the federal statute, but apparently has congressional ac-
quiescence.
Test III, extracted from section 1502(b), may be characterized as
the subjective medical-vocational approach. This test does little more
than repeat the terms of the statute.112 A person who has not qualified
for an award under Test I or Test II may be determined to be disabled
if the impairments he does possess, in light of his age, education and
work experience, make him unable to engage in any kind of substan-
tial, gainful work which exists to a significant degree in his geographi-
cal region or in several regions of the nation. Most of the cases which
reach at least the hearing examiner level involve this broad test,
because even a person with relatively severe impairments may have
sufficient residual skill and physical capacity to perform a number
of relatively simple occupations.
The "abstract capacity-for-gainful-activity" test is reached, how-
ever, only if the worker can first show by medical evidence that his
impairments are the primary reason for the inability to do his pre-
vious work or work commensurate with his previous work. Mere
failure to regain the old job or to obtain similar employment does not
suffice. Thus, although approximately half of the substantive claims
fail to qualify for an allowance under the objective and semi-objective
disability criteria of Tests I and II, and thus must be evaluated under
Test III, a majority of the persisting claims are denied at this point
111. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(c) (1971).
112. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
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because the "disabled" worker can still perform his last type of
work." 3
If the previous-work rule hurdle is surmounted by the claimant",
-which is analogous to a determination of occupational disability
-officials must determine if there are any jobs existing in "signi-
ficant numbers," either in the claimant's home area or in two or
more areas of the nation, which, theoretically, the claimant could
perform." 5 If the claimant has remained unemployed, not as a result
of his physical or mental impairment, but because he is unsuccessful
in obtaining work he could do or because work he could do does not
exist in his local area, he is not deemed disabled."' Even where his
inability to find work is due to the hiring practices of employers,
technological changes in the industry in which he has worked, or
cyclical economic conditions, the claim of the worker who can per-
form some type of work will fail." 7
Disability Insurance State Manual
For the guidance of the state agencies and BDI personnel at the
initial determination and reconsideration stages, SSA has compiled
the Disability Insurance State Manual. In addition to general guide-
lines for disability determinations, the Manual contains administra-
tive interpretations of the law and regulations in the form of Disabil-
ity Insurance Letters. Although theoretically the instructions or
guidelines that may form the basis for a disability determination
should be binding at all stages of the decisional process in order to
avoid reversals which are based simply on different understandings
113. Letter from Arthur E. Hess, Deputy Commissioner of Social Security Administration
to Professor Roger C. Cramton, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States,
November 30, 1971 (commenting on disability program research); interviews with Bureau of
Disability Insurance Staff, December, 1971.
114. In percentage terms the residuum of highly discretionary borderline claims under Test
III is a small portion-15 to 20%-of the total intake but the residuum is large in absolute
terms because of the high intake volume. Id. Also, as indicated in the next section, consistency
problems, although most urgent for this residuum group, affect the processing of claims under
the nominally more objective tests which are applied before reaching the abstract capacity-for-
gainful-activity test, which is often called the "national economy" test by SSA officials.
115. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(b) (1971).
116. Id. However, "isolated jobs of a type that exist only in very limited number or in
relatively few geographic locations shall not be considered to be 'work which exists in the
national economy' for purposes of determining . . . disability; an individual is not denied
benefits on the basis of the existence of such jobs." Id.
i17. Id.
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of basic policy, the Manual is not binding at the hearing examiner
stage or above. However, the Disability Insurance Letters which
comment on and seek to clarify the basic disability regulation"1 do
little more than paraphrase the statute or the regulation. Hence, a
state agency or BDI determiner working with the Manual and a
hearing examiner relying upon the regulations should not have mark-
edly different perceptions of the same case." 9
Yet, in clearer fashion than either the statute or the regulation,
Disability Insurance Letter 111-3 does create a presumption against
a finding of disability throughout the borderline claims area of Test
111.120 The presumption seems consistent with the apparent congres-
sional intent to create a premature involuntary retirement program
rather than a general unemployment or welfare program .'2 Claim-
ants affected by the presumption have already been denied a disabil-
ity allowance on the basis of Test I (the objective medical approach
based on listing of impairments) 22 and Test II (the "worn-out" man-
ual laborer syndrome).23 By definition, such claimants all retain
some residual functional capacity for work.
However logical and correct this adverse presumption may be for
the borderline cases under Test III, it has no binding effect above the
reconsideration stage. The significant difference in the vigor of its
application by hearing examiners and courts on the one hand, and by
the initial disability determiners on the other, indicates another defect
in the present system of disability standards. Even if the 1967 Amend-
ments induce the courts to modify their pro-claimant disposition,2 4
thus lessening the threat to hearing examiners of appellate reversal
of decisions adverse to claimants, the examiners may continue to be
more liberal than the state agency or BDI determiners. With the
unemployed and at least partially disabled claimant before him, a
hearing examiner may well be more reluctant to adhere to the adverse
118. Id. § 404.1502.
119. See OASI Disability Insurance Letters, Nos. 111-I, 111-2, 111-3 (issued July 4, 1967)
and 111-8 (issued Jan. 8, 1968; supplemented May 10, 1968) (filed in Part III of DISABILITY
INSURANCE STATE MANUAL), which attempt to provide guidance under the 1967 Amendments.
120. See id., Letter 111-3, at 3-4 (particularly the italicized portions). The Letter states that
"[i]n a predominant number of cases adjudicated under § 404.1502(b), the applicant will be
found to have the residual functional and vocational ability to meet job requirements ....
Id. at 3.
121. See note 99 supra.
122. See notes 104-10 supra and accompanying text.
123. See note I ll supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 199-217 infra and accompanying text.
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presumption than a determiner reacting only to the written record.
Moreover, an additional psychological factor may operate to main-
tain a significant rate of reversals by hearing examiners. The state
agency or BDI determiner receives a general mixture of cases, and
his tendency to occasionally vote affirmatively can find an
appropriate outlet in the Test I and Test II cases, while he still
upholds a stringent policy in the Test,III borderline area. But, be-
cause the hearing examiner receives a virtually unrelieved stream of
the closer Test III cases, his impulse to allow a certain number of
claims and his interest in exercising hearing examiner independence
can be fulfilled only by reversing Test III denials.
On the other hand, to the extent that they are based on an objec-
tive appraisal of the claimant's psychological condition manifested at
the hearing, a substantial number of hearing examiner reversals of
denial may be justified under the present standards. The claimant's
attitude towards enduring pain, discomfort and restricted movement,
his enthusiasm for trying to learn a new skill, his willingness to adjust
his life style to the need for greater off-the-job rest, his residual
vitality in general, and especially his pride, comprise his psychologi-
cal "set" and are relevant decisional factors in the borderline Test III
area. None of these combined fact-law considerations can be readily
determined by a medical expert, although medical factors are rele-
vant, nor can they be precisely decided by a vocational expert. Often,
a solution does not spring from the formal record but requires the
face-to-face contact of a hearing.
Thus, unintentionally, the SSA disability determination system
may be structured to guarantee a significant reversal rate by hearing
examiners. The "flush" system at the two lower determination levels
is too thorough, and the first decisional authority to have face-to-face
contact with claimants has its discretion warped by the unnaturally
skewed case population it receives. Although this phenomenon may
be a hazard in all appellate systems, it can be especially acute in the
disability field, where the hearing examiners operate under a very
subjective standard and, not being truly appellate,2 5 cannot resort to
the substantial evidence rule and simply sustain lower level denials
on that ground.
125. Although appellate in an administrative hierarchy sense, the examiners are generically
a trial body because they are the first SSA level empowered and obligated to build a formal
record which will provide a basis for court review under the substantial evidence rule. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.917, .921, .931 (1971).
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Rulings
The last category of formal standards in the disability determina-
tion process is made up of the Rulings which the Commissioner of
Social Security promulgates intermittently, primarily in response to
recommendations of the Appeals Council.'2  Normally, the Rulings
are inspired by particular Appeals Council or judicial decisions and
constitute an authoritative body of precedent binding on the entire
SSA administrative decisional process below the Appeals Council
level.' 2 1 If an Appeals Council determination is selected for
promulgation as a Ruling, the decision, in order to protect confiden-
tiality, is first generalized by deleting the names of parties and spe-
cific facts which would indicate identities. The Rulings based on
Appeals Council decisions, therefore, are more particularized than a
regulation but more abstract than an actual case precedent. At
present, the Rulings have not been issued in sufficient volume or with
sufficient precision to alleviate the problem of excessive administra-
tive discretion in the Test III borderline case area which is caused by
the abstract capacity-for-gainful-activity test.'12
CONSISTENCY IN THE APPLICATION OF STANDARDS
Processing a large number of claims under imprecise standards
makes it difficult to maintain consistency of treatment. With respect
to the SSA disability claims process, this problem is intensified due
to the numerous decision-making levels. 29 The actual, empirical di-
mensions of the general consistency question represent one of the
126. See id. § 422.408, which provides: "Social Security Rulings are published under the
authority of the Commissioner of Social Security and are binding on all components of the
Administration."
127. The regular Appeals Council and hearing examiner decisions are not published be-
cause of volume and in order to protect confidentiality and thus promote full disclosure of
medical evidence. They do not have precedential authority, even if known. See note 87 supra
and accompanying text.
128. In the period 1960-70, the Secretary issued 103 disability rulings, of which 59 were
based on agency decisions and 44 on court decisions. Since the 1967 Amendments fewer Rulings
have been issued. From 1968 through June 1971, 25 Rulings have been issued, of which 13 are
based on agency decisions and 12 on court decisions. Statistics compiled from Social Security
Rulings (1960-70). The Rulings deal not so much with questions of definition and discretion in
Test I I I cases as with narrow issues such as refusal to undergo corrective surgery for religious
reasons, refusal to submit to physical examination, effect of a prior disability determination
by another agency, or effect of confinement under a defective delinquent statute. This type of
Ruling is so specific that it would seldom be of help to a hearing examiner or administrative
official dealing with borderline cases at the reconsideration and hearing stages.
129. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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least studied aspects of administrative law. However, the consistency
of disability determinations has been subjected to extensive study
under contracts from HEW.1 3° Although these studies would be
more valuable if the research designs and analyses were more attuned
to current administrative law and procedure, and were directed to-
ward producing practical suggestions for administrative improve-
ment, they do provide a partial basis for the following analysis of the
consistency problem.
Consistency in Initial Determination and Reconsideration Stages
As the number of annual disability claims entering the system
climbs above one million, the number of these claims which reach the
hearing examiner stage is approaching forty thousand and may soon
exceed fifty thousand. Between the district office stage, where a disa-
bility claim is initially filed, and the hearing examiner level, a major
"flush" process occurs through the operation of BDI in the two
administrative decisional stages at the SSA-Baltimore head-
quarters-the initial determination stage and the reconsideration
stage.131 In each stage, there is joint federal-state agency action,
except for nonsubstantive technical denials, actions on foreign claims,
and other small special categories. Given the degree of discretion
allowed by the standards' and the large volume of claims, how
consistent are these Baltimore determinations? The decisional pro-
cess at the first two levels is documentary, with no face-to-face claim-
ant contact, a factor which probably enhances consistency but may
or may not promote correctness of decision.3  The consistency
problem is, of course, least troublesome regarding claims which can
be disposed of under the objective medical approach of Test 1 31 and
most troublesome in the area of discretion created by Test III which
entails the special abstract statutory concept of "workability." ''
However, in a particular case, officials considering a claim may disa-
gree on a number of questions: Should an allowance be made under
130. E.g., GOLDSBOROUGH, supra note 34; NAGI; SMITH & LILIENFELD, infra note 158.
131. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 96-101, 112-17 supra and accompanying text.
133. See text following note 124 supra; notes 262-63 infra and accompanying text.
134. See notes 104-10 supra and accompanying text. The phrase "Test I cases" conveys a
misleading simplicity. The Baltimore scrutiny may find that the state agency determination was
"correct" but may not agree with the category used.
135. See notes 112-17 supra and accompanying text. The Test II category for aged and
exhausted manual laborers, notes Ill supra and accompanying text, apparently poses little
problem.
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part one of Test I, which is keyed to a single impairment in the
authorized listing? Does the claimant's impairment correspond with
the one listed? Under part two of Test I, do the claimant's combined
impairments constitute the medical equivalent of a listed impair-
ment? Is the combination observed correct? Under Test III (abstract
capacity-for-gainful-activity test which adds to the medical factors
the elusive personal equation of age, education and vocational
ability), should the claim be allowed?
SSA does not publish percentile figures relating the substantive
allowances and denials at the various decisional levels to these three
tests. It is estimated, however, that at the initial and reconsideration
stages approximately 45-50 percent of all cases (excluding technical
denials) are allowed on the basis of Test I; 8-12 percent under Test
II; and 8-10 percent under the more borderline Test 111.36 The re-
maining 35-40 percent are denials. If 10 percent of these denials are
also hypothesized to have been made under Test III-a figure which
may be too low because of the presumption in favor of denying a
borderline case 13 -then approximately 20 percent of the total num-
ber of dispositions could be Within the borderline of Test III. Prob-
lems of consistency naturally would be expected in this area. How-
ever, the Nagi survey summarized below indicates that problems of
consistency are not confined to Test III determinations.
The Nagi Survey. Constituting the most recent large-scale study
relevant to the question of consistency in Baltimore determina-
tions, 38 the Nagi survey was undertaken prior to adoption of the
present sampling techniques" 9 at a time when SSA-Baltimore re-
viewed all state agency initial determination actions. The Nagi study
focused on the sociological concept of the relative need of the claim-
ant for disability payments, rather than considering the legal question
of whether a conscious and stringent congressional policy of limiting
disability to unavoidable premature retirement was being followed.
Special clinical panels were used to review a selected sample of actual
SSA decisions, but the panels did not include anyone sensitive to the
legal aspects of the narrow congressional purpose. Hence, one sur-
prising result of the study is that, on an overall basis, the legally
untrained teams were only slightly more favorable to the claimants
136. Selected Data (Sept.), supra note 7.
137. See notes 120-23 supra and accompanying text.
138. NAI 26.
139. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
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than were the trained state agency teams and the BDI staff. In the
sample used, the BDI allowance rate was 61.5 percent; the clinical
team allowance rate was 68.1 percent. 140
The Nagi study was based upon four evaluations of disability: (1)
the initial evaluation made by the state agency team under regular
procedures; (2) a redetermination by the state agency team on the
basis of new information accumulated by the clinical team; (3) the
initial determination by BDI (reviewing the state agency and also
considering the new information); (4) the disability determination by
the clinical teams. 4' The first three evaluations were dichoto-
mous-that is, either an allowance or a denial of disability. In the
fourth determination, however, the clinical teams evaluated the
claimant's fitness for employment over a continuum which included
eight classifications ranging from "fit for work under normal
conditions" to "disabled."'4 2
The Nagi study showed that, with respect to the clinical teams'
categories which would seem to be non-borderline, there was over a
30 percent margin of difference between the teams' and BDI's deci-
sions.4 3 For example, of those persons found by the clinical teams
to be fit for specific jobs (excluding the claimant's former job), 36
percent nevertheless received an SSA allowance, and of those per-
sons found by the clinical teams to be fit for work only at home, 30.5
percent were nevertheless denied disability by SSA.44 The clinical
teams found a large portion of the sample to be totally unfit for work,
140. NAGI 99. On a case-by-case basis, however, significant inconsistencies appear. See
notes 143-45 infra and accompanying text.
141. NAOi 30-31.
142. The eight-point clinical continuum included the following classifications: fit for work
under normal conditions; fit for specific jobs including former job, under normal conditions;
fit for specific jobs excluding former job, under normal conditions; fit for work under special
conditions; can work part-time under normal conditions; can work under sheltered conditions;
can work at home only; not fit for work. Id. at 94.
In order to permit some comparison of the clinical teams' evaluations with the SSA
evaluations, the eight point clinical continuum was made artificially dichotomous by treating
the last three categories ("sheltered conditions" and below) as allowances, and the first five
categories as denials. There are difficulties, however, with such a dichotomy for comparison
purposes. It forces into the "allowances" category one continuum point, sheltered conditions,
which, like the part-time and the special conditions continuum points, may yield an SSA denial
if the work performed under sheltered conditions "provides evidences of skills and abilities that
demonstrate an ability to engage in a substantial gainful activity, whether or not such work in
itself constitutes substantial gainful activity," 20 C.F.R. § 404.1532(e) (1971), particularly if
the earnings exceed a certain level. See id. §§ 404.1532(e), .1533, .1534(b)-(d) (1971).
143. NAGI 94.
144. Id.
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but almost a quarter of that segment was denied disability by SSA.115
Hence, the clinical teams' overall allowance rate of 68.1 percent
probably coincides relatively well with the actual SSA allowance rate
of 61.5 percent not because of any true consistency, but only because
of a fortuitous cancelling-out process in which a large difference with
BDI decisions at one end of the clinical teams' continuum is balanced
by an equally large discrepancy at the other end. Moreover, two
systems of evaluation which look similar in overall results but operate
so differently in particular cases cannot both be right, although both
could be wrong.
The Nagi study indicated that physical limitations have a closer
association with allowance rates than do observed psychological limi-
tations. For example, of those persons clinically determined to have
a near total physical limitation, 88.9 percent received a BDI
allowance; however, of those persons with near total psychological
limitation, only 50.1 percent received an allowance."' The clinical
teams and BDI reacted to aggravated psychological limitations quite
differently-in the near-total-psychological-limitation category, the
clinical teams' allowance rate would have been 76 percent. 47 These
observations indicate a possible reason for the high rate of reversal
of SSA denials by hearing examiners.' The psychological factors
which are overridden by physical factors in BDI determinations may
become dominant in the largely borderline cases which reach the
hearing examiner level.'
In the Nagi survey, the eight-point continuum of clinical team
observations was also regrouped into a trichotomous employability
breakdown-"fit," "unfit," and "borderline"-and then were
compared with the dichotomous BDI allowance-denial decisions.,
At the two extremes of fitness and unfitness there was a 26.9 percent
145. Id.
146. Id. at 99.
147. Id.
148. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
149. As intimated earlier, the borderline cases often turn on an assessment of the claimant's
residual vigor. See discussion in first paragraph following note 124 supra. This is a non-clinical
matter related to work attitude in the face of physical adversity about which there can be little
objective data in the claimant's file. The lack of agreed standards on how to react to psychiatric
evaluations, when they exist, is also troublesome. Approximately 14.8% of the consultative
examinations in 1970 were psychiatric, and psychiatric disorders ranked fourth in incidence of
disability by diagnostic categories. Memorandum from BDI, SSA to Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,
Dec., 1971.
150. NAGI 115.
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and 27.0 percent discrepancy respectively between the clinical teams'
determinations and BDI determinations. 5' In the group treated by
the clinical teams as more borderline, the allowance-denial rates were
equal.1 2 Although these cases were a relatively small portion of the
total Nagi sample (14.2 percent), they could be expected to be a large
percentage of the total claims which ultimately reach hearing examin-
ers.
On the basis of this analysis, the Nagi study suggests some hy-
potheses relevant to the consistency problems: (1) the greatest diffi-
culty in achieving consistency centers on the psychological factor;5 3
(2) with respect to those borderline claimants unfit for many jobs but
with considerable residual functional capacity, the consistency rate
may be only 50 percent; (3) because the kinds of cases which raised
the greatest problems of consistency at the Baltimore level of
decision-making probably comprise the bulk of hearing examiner
appeals,'54 and because the examiners have no more precise decisional
guidelines than do the SSA-determiners, a corresponding consistency
problem might be found to exist at the hearing examiner level if the
matter were subjected to a similar study.'
The figures of the Nagi study suggest that a goal of rapid and
consistent determination of most claims with a minimal margin of
error may be difficult to achieve and that this difficulty may center
not so much in the procedures used to process disability claims as in
the inexactness of the standards in the statute and implementing
regulations. 5 If these indications are valid, repetitive reviews merely
offer new opportunities for the further exercise of discretion. Al-
though Nagi's teams were not using the legal tests of disability em-
ployed by BDI,15 a distinction which dictates much caution in mak-
ing comparisons and drawing conclusions, the approach which they
utilized was not wholly dissimilar, given the intrinsic indefiniteness
of the SSA standards themselves. Thus, the fact that the allowance
determinations of SSA and the clinical teams fell outside a 10 percent
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See text following note 124 supra.
154. See notes 112-17 supra and accompanying text (Test III/borderline cases).
155. Indeed, if there were any way to administer the study, a scrutiny of consistency in
disability determinations among United States district courts is needed for a full understanding
of the consistency issue.
156. See notes 96-101, 112-17 supra and accompanying text.
157. NAGI 23-27.
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range of difference in so many instances may be a matter for con-
cern. 5 '
The Reconsideration Stage. No current counterpart to the Nagi
study of BDI initial determinations exists for the reconsideration
stage. However, the SSA Operations Research Staff has produced a
report dealing with the reconsideration stage which summarizes re-
sponses to a questionnaire sent to reconsideration determiners. 59
Most of the allowances at the reconsideration level-reversals of
initial denials-were attributed to "additional evidence,"' 6 but to an
unmeasured extent the changes were actually due to the worsening
of the claimant's condition rather than to a better work-up of the
report on the initial condition. The report observed that reconsidera-
tion determinations were likely to involve borderline cases and that
fewer administrative presumptions were utilized at this level.)", The
158. For example, the divergence exceeded 10% for those persons in the physical category
classified clinically as "near total," and approached 10% for those classified as "severe." Id.
at 99. The overall differences in allowance rates-61.5% by the SSA and 68.1% by the clinical
panels-is misleadingly small because it is. the product of cancelling out the wider divergencies
at opposite ends of the clinical evaluation continuum. See notes 150-51 supra and accompany-
ing text.
A Johns Hopkins study of a sample of SSA disability applicants compared the post-decision
experience of those claimants allowed benefits with those denied benefits. R. SMITH & A.
LILIENFELD, THE OASDI DISABILITY PROGRAM: AN EVALUATION STUDY (1971) (SSA contract
study with Johns Hopkins University). The study included a BDI reevaluation (unofficial) based
on a new file compiled by the study group. The time of compilation varied from one to four
years after the initial allowance or denial of a benefit. The new file did not reveal the nature of
the initial BDI decision, nor the subsequent official record of the applicant, if any. The results
of the BDI unofficial reevaluation showed: (1) that 24% of the denied applicants were now
assessed as eligible, and (2) that 20% of all claimants given allowances were now judged to be
ineligible. Id. at 77. See also id. at 2-5, 76-78, 195. The study did not attempt to isolate or test
hypotheses which could explain the differences-for example, possible bias in the initial sam-
pling technique. However, one familiar with the Nagi study could hypothesize that, in addition
to the obvious time factors, discrepancies of this order could be expected simply by the margin
of error in the initial official decision process. The study made no attempt to determine how
many of the initial decisions had been officially changed, either by withdrawing or granting an
allowance. BDI estimates that about one-third of denied applicants submit second applications
and about 25% of these reapplications are reclassified as allowances. No estimate is available
regarding initial allowances later terminated. BDI Interviews, supra note 1 i3.
159. M. Rock, An Evaluation of the SSA Appeals Process: Progress Rep. No. Four (1967)
(prepared by SSA Operations Research Stafi) (unpublished and on file with SSA).
This Progress Report and others cited infra are the result of internal administrative studies.
Although they contain much valuable hard data, the SSA in releasing them cautions that they
are not to be taken as definitive treatments of the topics studied.
160. Id. at 5.
161. Id. at 9, 12. See discussion of the SSA presumption in borderline cases at notes 120-
23 supra and accompanying text.
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report suggested that more thorough work in the district offices might
be a solution to the problem of incomplete evidence." 2
The State Agency Operation. The analysis of the state agency
operation is partially subsumed in the discussion of the Nagi survey
and the reconsideration stage '63 because of the joint state-BDI
agency operation at both initial and reconsideration determination
stages. However, a report by the SSA Operations Research Staff
noted the existence at the state agency level of a continuing standards
problem and of inadequate factual work-up in the borderline cases.'"4
The suggestion was made, for example, that improvement in the
"quality and uniformity" of disability assessments might result if all
claimants were processed through a "government-controlled, clinic-
type evaluation center."'6 More frequent meetings of claims examin-
ers were also suggested. Moreover, dissatisfaction was expressed over
the "bounce" policy of BDI-returning a case to the state agency for
better documentation or for a negotiated change of decision. The
criticisms concerned the fluctuation in return rates due to policy
changes in BDI and the lack of specification by BDI of other areas
of the cases needing further development."'6
Consistency at the Hearing Examiner Level
No counterpart to the Nagi study of decision making in SSA-
Baltimore determinations exists for the hearing examiner level. How-
ever, some pertinent facts can be derived from the hearing examiner
production statistics maintained by the Bureau of Hearings and Ap-
peals and from some reports by the SSA Operations Research Staff.
Hearings Examiner Variances in Reversal Rates. Production sta-
tistics reveal the existence of extreme disparities among an apprecia-
ble number of hearing examiners, not only on a national scale, but
within the same region, regarding their rate of reversal of SSA deci-
162. Some reconsideration determiners were unhappy with the production requirements
and felt that they adversely affected the quality of the work. Progress Rep. No. Four, supra
note 159, at 28-29. One determiner, revealing the amount of personalization which can be
attempted even without face-to-face contact with the claimant, said: "While medical findings
are vital to our adjudication process, they must be related to the individual's level of functioning
as well as to his education and work history." Id. at 34.
163. See pp. 711-15 supra.
164. M. Rock & R. Schumer, An Evaluation of the SSA Appeals Process: Progress Rep.
No. Five (1968) (prepared by SSA Operations Research Staff) (unpublished and on file with
SSA).
165. Id. at 22.
166. Id. at 17-18.
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sions. Such data provide a further basis for questioning the certainty
of the standards and the adequacy of present Appeals Council review
as a centralizing, standardizing force.
On a national or regional basis, any disparities between individual
hearing examiners are concealed by the averaging process. For exam-
ple, in fiscal year 1971 the national mean reversal rate by SSA hear-
ing examiners was approximately 46 percent.'67 The regional reversal
rates ranged from a high of 51.2 percent in Region 9 (San Francisco)
to 40.4 percent in Region 2 (New York).'"
However, with respect to individual hearing examiners, the differ-
ences in reversal rates are striking and disturbing. 9 An analysis of
252 hearing examiners showed that 153 had reversal rates ranging
individually between 36 percent and 55 percent (of these 90 had rates
between 41 percent and 50 percent). However, of the other 99 exam-
iners falling outside this range, 19 had reversal rates as high as 66-80
percent, while 26 fell within a 21-30 percent zone. The remaining 54
examiners were grouped in two clusters with reversal rates of 56-65
percent (32) and 31-35 percent (22) respectively. 70 Although
these figures compare hearing examiner reversal rate inconsistency
on a national basis, similar disparities appear inside a given region
and even within intraregional offices. 17' Monthly production statistics
of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals support the additional hy-
pothesis that the reversal rate of particular hearing examiners can be
predicted with fair accuracy and that the stringency of the approach
of a given examiner applies to each of the three types of disability
167. Statistics were furnished by Carlile Bolton-Smith, Liaison Officer, Bureau of Hearings
and Appeals, Feb. 29, 1972 (on file with author).
168.
Region 9, San Francisco 51.2% Region 4, Atlanta 43.9%
Region 7, Kansas City 50.3% Region 8, Denver 43.8%
Region 10, Seattle 50.1% Region 6, Dallas 43.2%
Region 5, Chicago 50.1% Region 1, Boston 42.3%
Region 3, Philadelphia 47.7% Region 2, New York 40.4%
Id. These differences do not appear large given the nature and volume of the program and
possible inter-regional differences with respect to the climate of court review and the case mix.
At this point, we are not concerned with the separate question of whether the average level of
reversals is itself so high as to raise questions about the standards and the dichotomy between
the reconsideration stage and the hearing examiner stage.
169. Id.
170. Id. Five hearing examiners ranged from 7% reversals up to 18%; another six ranged
from 84 to 88%. Thus, 42% of the individual hearing examiner reversal rates fell outside a 20%
spread centered on the national mean. Id.
171. These observations are based on production figures for the West Coast Region com-
piled by the author.
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examiner's decisions: disability claims decided after a hearing; disa-
bility claims decided "on record;" and cessation actions (terminating
a disability award). 17 2
The hearing examiner reversal rates in the "on record" cases are
particularly instructive as to the clarity of standards question and the
different policy perceptions of SSA-Baltimore and the hearing exam-
iners. In these cases, the claimant has waived his right to appear
personally and requests a decision on the basis of the evidence con-
tained in the file. 73 Generally, the file contains the same evidence
that was before the BDI disability determiner in the reconsideration
stage. It would be reasonable to believe that only a small percentage
of such cases would be reversed if hearing examiners apply the same
standards as used by reconsideration determiners. However, the Bu-
reau of Hearings and Appeals hearing examiner production figures
for fiscal years 1960-70 indicate that examiners affirmed 2,272 "on
record" cases and reversed 1,446, or 38 percent of these cases. 7,
These figures raise questions not only with respect to the clarity of
disability standards but also with respect to experience and training
in the rapidly expanding SSA hearing examiner corps and the ade-
quacy of examiner access to medical advice.
The foregoing figures on distribution of reversal rates among
hearing examiners introduce a new uncertainty in the decision-
making process for disability claims. When an evaluation system be-
gins with an objective medical assessment, such extreme divergence
in reversal rates among hearing examiners raises questions of equal
dispensation of justice. If inexactness of standards is the crucial vice,
the cure is not to be found in more formal hearings or more appellate
review, for these devices will merely carry the discretionary inequality
to ever higher levels.
1967 Questionnaire. A questionnaire sampling made in 1967111
provides some additional insights (but no figures) into hearing exam-
iner reversal rates. This study was made prior to the 1967 Amend-
ments, when many courts were interpreting the congressional stand-
172. The hypothesis is supported by the observations of a hearing examiner who had studied
consistency problems and is verified by independent examination of monthly BHA Hearing
Examiner Case Docket and Disposition Data Sheets.
173. See note 63 supra and accompany text.
174. 1972 Statistics, supra note 167.
175. M. Rock & F. lchinowski, An Evaluation of the SSA Appeals Process: Progress Rep.
No. Three (1967) (prepared by SSA Operations Research Stafl) (unpublished and on file with
SSA).
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ard very liberally to the advantage of claimants.'76 Accordingly, it
is not surprising to find that many hearing examiners commented
that "for whatever decision they wished to make, they could find a
court opinion to back them up." '177 Continued problems with stand-
ards, apart from the subjectivity of judicial policy, were indicated
by the suggestion that there should be "more written opinions from
the Appeals Council for their reversals in order to guide the hearing
examiners and enable them to cite these as authority for hearing
examiner decisions."'' 78 It was suggested that more informative
Appeals Council determinations would relieve the hearing examiners
of the burden of searching for precedents. 179
The study considered inadequacy of evidence to be a continuing
problem and suggested that a "good initial evaluation may save
money in the long run."' 0 New evidence was given as the most fre-
quent reason for reversals. 81 The hearing examiners noted, however,
that the claimant was the poorest source of evidence and that medical
advisers, followed closely by vocational experts, were the best sources
of evidence.12 This does not mean that the hearing could or should
be discontinued. The medical advisers and vocational experts react,
in part, to the demeanor of the claimant at the hearing. Also, their
favorable standing with examiners may be based more on their "in-
terpretative" aid to the examiner than the evidentiary value of their
record testimony in the legal sense.
Reversal rates were also perceived to be related in a subtle way
to prolonged unemployment and the probability of continued, indefi-
nite, or permanent unemployment. Therefore, allowing an extended
time limit for an appeal (up to 6 months to request a reconsideration,
176. See notes 199-217 infra and accompanying text.
177. Progress Rep. No. Three, supra note 175, at 7.
178. Id. at 13.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 18.
181. Reversals were especially high among claims involving strong multiple impairments,
psychological impairments, and physical impairments with a strong psychological overlay.
However, some degree of psychological complication appears in most cases. Id. at 19. The
importance of the psychological factor poses a serious problem with respect to the correctness
and consistency of decisions. The SSA system may not be geared to produce this evidence with
sufficient regularity; moreover, standards for evaluating psychological evidence are always
extremely subjective.
182. Id. at 12. In socio-economic terms, the average appellant-claimants were illiterate or
semi-literate and usually non-skilled. They lacked complete medical histories because they did
not have regular physicians. Id. at 22. For discussion of the potential impact of the claimant's
appearance at the hearing examiner stage, see text following note 124 supra.
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and if it is denied, another 6 months to request a hearing) increases
the length of the established unemployment period and may itself
contribute to the reversal rate. 83
Analytical Studies Concerning Hearing Participants and Non-
Adversary System. Beginning in 1969, the SSA Operations Research
Staff began a series of studies on administrative effectiveness based
on case analysis, rather than questionnaires, with special attention to
reversal rates. A report on hearing examiner decisions in fiscal years
1965-68 analyzed reversal rates in relation to the presence or absence
at the hearing of various experts or representatives, such as
vocational counsellors, non-attorney representatives, attorneys, or
medical advisers.184
The data indicated that the rate of reversals is substantially higher
if the hearing is held with either an attorney or medical adviser pres-
ent in addition to the claimant."" With one of these additional per-
sons present the reversal rates were 54.8 percent and 51.4 percent
respectively in fiscal year 1968.186 On the other hand, there were
reversal rates in that year of 39.8 percent when claimants appeared
alone at a hearing and 36.4 percent for on-the-record decisions with
claimant waiving his right of appearance. 8 The reversal rate was
increased only slightly if, in addition to the claimant, a non-attorney
representative was present (44.5 percent) or a vocational counsellor
attended (39.3 percent).' These ratios indicate that a vocational
183. Progress Rep. No. Three, supra note 175, at 15. See also id. at 32-33.
184. M. Rock & R. Berwanger, An Evaluation of the SSA Appeals Process: Progress Rep.
No. Six (1969) (prepared by SSA Operations Research Stafl) (unpublished and on file with
SSA).
185. Id. at 13. Various hypotheses may be offered, and rebutted, as possible explanations
for the higher reversal rate in the claimant-with-attorney cases. Id. at 5-7. For example, claim-
ants confident that they are disabled may approach attorneys more often, but the contrary
could also be true-claimants with strong cases may avoid the expense of an attorney. Argua-
bly, lawyers tend to reject those cases with a low likelihood of success, but non-attorney cases
could be affected by this same screening process-assuming in each case that the screener
knows enough about SSA to be able to identify a strong case. More plausible explanations for
the higher reversal rates in attorney cases may be (1) the attorneys present the cases better; (2)
a hearing examiner may anticipate that attorney-represented cases are more likely to be ap-
pealed and possibl ' reversed; and (3) some hearing examiners may be inclined to favor a fellow
professional since the proceeding is non-adversary.
The high reversal rate when a medical adviser testifies may be explained by the tendency
of the hearing examiner to call a medical adviser in close cases. But this fact alone would not
produce a high reversal rate unless there were'a pro-claimant bias among the medical advisers.
186. Id. at 13.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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counsellor, by inducing fewer reversals than an attorney or a medical
adviser, has aless disruptive effect on SSA policy manifested in pre-
hearing level determinations.8 9
A later report continues an analysis of reversal rates9 ' and sub-
stantiates the earlier report by demonstrating that the presence of
medical advisers, attorneys, and-to a slightly lesser extent-the non-
attorney representatives produces the highest reversal rates., The
189. The frequency distribution for the various types of participants in hearings in fiscal
years 1965-68 averaged approximately 49% with the claimant alone at the hearing, 36% with
one additional participant (expert or personal representative), and 15% with more than one
additional participant. Id. at 17. The more detailed breakdown of participants in fiscal year
1968 was:
Claimant alone at hearing 48.7% "
Vocational counsellor 28.5%
Non-attorney representative 7.9%
Attorney 22.8%
Medical adviser 10.4%
Id. at 18. The percentages add up to more than 100% because of the overlap in cases where
more than one expert or representative was involved.
190. M. Rock, An Evaluation of the SSA Appeals Process: Progress Rep. No. Seven (1970)
(prepared by SSA Operations Research Staff) (unpublished and on file with SSA).
191. Sixteen combinations are possible, ranging from a hearing with the claimant alone
present, through hearings with the claimant plus various combinations of additional partici-
pants, to a hearing with the claimant and a full complement of additional participants-medical
adviser, lawyer, non-attorney representative, and vocational adviser. The various reversal rates
in the period 1965 to 1969 are summarized in the following table:
PARTICIPANT COMBINATIONS: THEIR FREQUENCY, RELATIVE FREQUENCY, NUMBER REVERSED,
AND REVERSAL RATES
M = medical adviser
L = lawyer
Relative Frequency
.4955
.0233
.1256
.0626
.1477
.0098
.0033
.0027
.0296
.0630
.0162
.0003
.0147
.0039
.0011
.0006
1.0000
N = non-attorney
V = vocational consultant
Number Reversed Reversal Rates (%)
14393 38.8
958 54.8
5081 54.0
2275 48.5
4378 39.5
477 65.0
158 64.8
128 63.1
1036 46.7
2699 57.2
625 51.5
19 76.0
650 58.8
183 63.3
48 57.1
31 73.8
33139 44.23
Participants
NONE
M
L
N
V
ML
MN
LN
M'V
LV
NV
LMN
MLV
MNV
LNV
MLNV
TOTAL
Frequency
37123
1748
9413
4692
11070
734
244
203
2220
4720
1214
25
1105
289
84
42
74926
Vol. 1972:681]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
presence of one or more of the four possible participants at the hear-
ing depends on choices made by the claimant regarding an attorney
or a non-attorney representative and by the hearing examiner regard-
ing a medical adviser or a vocational consultant. The SSA study
showed that the choice made by one party often influences the other
party's choice. When a claimant is represented by a lawyer, the exam-
iner tends to request expert testimony-hearing examiners selected
experts in 41.1 percent of the cases in which the claimant had a
lawyer, but in only 27.1 percent and 28.8 percent respectively of the
cases where the claimant selected a non-attorney representative or
had no representative.12
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SSA DISABILITY DETERMINATION STANDARD
The role of the courts in reviewing SSA disability determinations
is the best known and probably the most widely studied aspect of the
total disability claim structure.1 3 The main areas of judicial concern,
both before and after the 1967 Amendments, have been the interpre-
tations of the statutory disability standards, the burden of proof, and
the substantial evidence rule. Although there are some indications
that the 1967 Amendments have had the effect of forcing the courts
to adhere more closely to the congressional concept of total disabil-
Id. at Appendix I.
The reversal rate for hearings involving only lawyers (54.05%) was 15.2% higher than the
reversal rates in cases without any participants (38.8%); the rate for medical advisers only
(54.8%) was 16.0% higher. These effects are cumulative-the reversal rate in cases with both
lawyers and medical advisers present but with no other participants (65.0%) was 26.2% higher.
Vocational consultants, when operating alone, have little effect on the reversal rate (39.5%).
Because each participant can appear in, or be absent from, a number of different combina-
tions, an averaging process can be used to determine the effect of individual participants on
the reversal rates. The computations on average effect are as follows: lawyer, plus 12.1%; non-
attorney representative, plus 10.4%; vocational and medical adviser, plus 11.7%; vocational
consultant, minus 2.1%. Id. at 13.
192. Id. at 8. Hearing examiners may be induced to utilize experts in claimant-with-
attorney cases in order to take some of the pressure off themselves and in order to build a more
solid case for the appeal which the lawyer will probably take if he loses. From July 1, 1966 to
December 31, 1967, 59% of the denials in hearing cases involving lawyers were appealed to the
Appeals Council; this is in contrast to 47% of the denials in cases without lawyers. Id. at 9.
193. See 3 G. GOLDSBOROUGH, supra note 34; Rockman, Judicial Review of Benefit Deter-
minations in the Social Security and Veterans Administration (Report to the Committee on
Grants and Benefits, Administrative Conference of the United States, 1970); Rowland, Judicial
Review of Disability Determinations, 52 GEo. L.J. 42, 76-85 (1963); Viles, supra note 94; Note,
Administrative Procedure and the Social Security Disability Program, 2 IND. LEG. F. 295, 306-
10 (1969); Note, Social Security Disability Determinations: The Burden of Proof on Appeal,
63 MICH. L. REV. 1465 (1965).
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ity,1"4 the number of appeals from the administrative decisional pro-
cess to the district courts continues at a high rate-l,392, 1,369, and
1,537 in calendar years 1969, 1970 and 1971 respectively.9 5 Most of
the appealed cases are borderline determinations under Test 111,19
and the high rate of appeals can be expected to continue unless the
basic standard for determining disability is radically overhauled.
Given this reality, only a fairly rigid adherence to the substantial
evidence rule 97 can minimize the reversal rate in district courts.9 8
Ultimately, the courts' adherence to the substantial evidence rule and
to the intent of the 1967 Amendments can be enforced only by the
Supreme Court, which thus far has infrequently reviewed disability
cases.
Pre-1968 Development
A study commissioned by the SSA in 1962 surveyed the adminis-
trative procedures and analyzed almost 2,000 court decisions in light
of the elusive statutory concept of total disability."9 The study does
not contain percentage classifications of the character of decisions
rendered, but it does attempt to group the decisions into meaningful
substantive categories and identify problem areas. The chief source
of difficulty perceived was the standard of disability itself, which, "in
the absence of summary regulations," was often by default "con-
signed to the courts." '' Other problem areas, all derived from the
imprecision of the legal standard, included the burden of proof, the
courts' apparent distrust of the SSA administrative process, and the
courts' lack of adherence to the substantial evidence rule.20 1 Although
the statutory standard has always been total incapacity for gainful
employment in the national economy, rather than the more limited
concept of occupational disability,20 2 the inherent subjectivity of the
disability concept permits either a strict or liberal approach toward
total disability, individualization of the test, and burden of proof. On
the whole, the SSA, bolstered by its perception of legislative history
194. See notes 96-101 supra and accompanying text.
195. See note 92 supra.
196. See notes 112-17 supra and accompanying text.
197. See notes 235-56 infra and accompanying text.
198. The reversal rate was 36% in calendar year 1970. See note 92 supra.
199. See 3 G. GOLDSBOROUGH, supra note 34.
200. Id. at I (Introduction).
201. Id.
202. See notes 96-101 supra and accompanying text.
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and the statutory language, has espoused a strict interpretation° 3-a
position towards which most courts were restive or flatly opposed
prior to the 1967 Amendments.
Judicial opposition to a strict approach to the total disability
concept culminated in an opinion by Judge Friendly in Kerner v.
Fleming,"'4 which concerned a claimant who had worked as carpen-
ter, salesman, mechanic and upholsterer, but who at the time of trial
suffered from diabetes, a cardiac condition and anxiety neurosis. The
court held that a disability determination must rest on the "resolution
of two issues-what can applicant do, and what employment oppor-
tunities are there for a man who can do only what applicant can
do?"20°5 This ruling, quickly dubbed the Kerner doctrine, in effect
redefined "substantial gainful activity," and its holding dominated
the judicial approach toward review of SSA disability hearing exam-
iner decisions at least until the enactment of the 1967 Amendments."'
The formulation of the first question of the Kerner doctrine is not
a novel construction, inasmuch as it flows from the statute itself. But
the second question, in turning on the phrase "employment
opportunities," rejected the SSA abstract-capacity approach, since
the court added the explicit direction that "[m]ere theoretical ability
to engage in substantial gainful activity is not enough if no reasonable
opportunity for this is available."2 ' Moreover, the court directed that
the HEW Secretary "furnish information as to the employment op-
portunities . . . or the lack of them, for persons of plaintiff's skills
and limitations." ' In short, the Kerner doctrine took a long step
toward converting the disability concept into a limited unemployment
compensation program and toward placing the burden of supplying
the critical evidence of specific employment availabilities on the
SSA if a denial of disability were to be sustained.2 9
After Kerner, another panel of the Second Circuit, with Judge
Friendly not participating, rendered an opinion in Rinaldi v.
203. See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
204. 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960).
205. Id. at 921 (emphasis added).
206. For a list of cases following the Kerner doctrine, see 22 A.L.R.3d 440, 446-49 (1968).
207. 283 F.2d at 921.
208. Id. at 922. The Administration necessarily acquiesced in the Kerner ruling and remand
to the extent of producing additional information on employment opportunities. There followed
another administrative rejection of Kerner's claim, and the court upheld the denial. Kerner v.
Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1965).
209. 3 G. GOLDSBOROUGH, supra note 34, ch. I at 18.
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Ribicoff1 ° which seemed to offer a compromise between the initial
rigidity of SSA and Judge Friendly's formulation of personalized
actual employability. The case concerned a claimant whose injury
precluded him from resuming truck driving or engaging in heavy
manual labor. Although nominally purporting to follow Kerner, the
court effectively rewrote the two key formulations, thereby facilitat-
ing the denial of claims: (1) if other individuals with similar impair-
ments can do certain jobs, the plaintiff can as well, and (2) if others
with similar impairments can obtain such jobs, so can the plaintiff.21
The Rinaldi approach would still impose on the SSA the burden of
going foreward with the evidence but would open the way to the use
of a variety of empirical studies yielding detailed pattern evidence of
employment for partially disabled workers in the national economy.
The burden would then shift to the plaintiff, who retained the ulti-
mate burden of proof, to show why he did not fall within the pattern.
As the case law developed prior to 1968, the Kerner doctrine,
rather than the possibly workable Rinaldi approach, tended to domi-
nate judicial review of SSA disability determinations. The SSA re-
sisted and occasionally expressly declined to acquiesce in cases re-
versing its determinations.212 However, by 1967 the federal courts had
delineated several procedural and substantive requirements which
generally favored the claimant.213 The courts shifted the burden of
producing evidence on the question of the existence of some gainful
activity in which claimant could engage from the claimant to SSA.
2 1
The courts allowed proof of disability to include personality disor-
ders, pain and suffering, and lack of motivation .1 5 The Administra-
tion was also required to prove the availability of employment within
the claimant's capacity by specific reference to job positions located
in the claimant's home area. 216
In requiring that the SSA prove, as a condition of a denial, that
210. 305 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1962).
211. See id. at 549-50. See also 3 G. GOLDSBOROUGH, supra note 34, ch. I at 74 for
discussion of the standards-proof interface. A Department of Labor study listing 214 jobs which
workers with back conditions like the claimant's could perform, and were performing, appar-
ently was viewed as sufficient to resolve both questions against the instant plaintiff. 305 F.2d
at 550.
212. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Celebrezze, 357 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1966), nonacquiesced in,
S.S.R. 67-14c (1967).
213. See Viles, supra note 94, at 397-98.
214. May v. Gardner, 362 F.2d 616, 618 (6th Cir. 1966).
215. Carico v. Gardner, 377 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1967).
216. Boyd v. Gardner, 377 F.2d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1967).
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there were jobs that claimant could do and that these were actually
available in the area where he lived, the courts not only repealed the
''national economy" concept of the statute and the regulations but
also added employability as a factor which the agency must prove.
The effect of this approach could operate to place the ultimate burden
of proof on the SSA, contrary to the intent of the statute. 21 7
Judicial Reception of the 1967 Amendments
The 1967 Amendments of the statutory disability standard"' were
the culmination of extensive administrative and congressional consid-
eration of the problem of court reversals.219 The Amendments re-
flected the concern of Congress both over the lack of uniformity and
consistency in the processing and review of disability cases220 and over
the high reversal rate of SSA hearing examiners in district courts.22 '
The legislation clarified two troublesome points. First, Congress
made it clear that abstract capacity for work and not actual employa-
bility is the principle test, regardless of whether a "specific job va-
cancy exists" or whether a claimant would be "hired. '222 Second, the
region to be considered for work availability consists not merely of
the claimant's immediate dwelling area but rather the entire geo-
graphical area upon which the "national economy" is based.223
Despite early resistance, the present trend indicates that the cir-
cuit courts will follow the congressional intent as expressed in the
1967 Amendments. The Third Circuit, reversing a district court
which had followed the old employability test, 2 stated that, because
of the explicit congressional command, the possible unwillingness of
some employers to hire the handicapped should not be considered
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) (1970).
218. See notes 96-101 supra and accompanying text.
219. See H.R. REP. No. 544, supra note 99, at 28-31; S. REP. No. 744, supra note 99, at
46-50.
220. See H.R. REP. No. 544, supra note 99, at 29.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 30, 163.
223. Id. See note 101 supra. However, the 1967 Amendments initially seemed to have only
a slight beneficial impact on district court reversal rates-there was only a 64% affirmance rate
in 1970. See note 92 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, they seem to have had little effect
on the high rate of reversals by hearing examiners of SSA-Baltimore determinations. See note
74 supra.
224. Gentile v. Finch, 298 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd, 423 F.2d 244 (3d Cir.
1970).
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in determining disability.2 2 1 In Miller v. Finch,226 the Eighth
Circuit, noting that the claimant's brief indicated that SSA is re-
quired to show that jobs existed within a reasonable distance from
the claimant's home, stated that a person is not disabled under the
Act if "he can engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy. ' ' 221 However, a few district
courts have balked at the seemingly clear expression of congressional
intent. In Jones v. Cohen,2 s the district court stated that the re-
quirement to show "employability" had not been changed by the
statute.22 1 In Taylor V. Gardner,30 the district court drew a distinc-
tion between the "ability to perform the acts which constitute a
certain job and the ability to hold down that job"' 1 and held that
the SSA must prove that "the claimant could successfully remain
employed in a job.
The Kerner allocation to SSA of the burden of going forward with
the evidence on the details of the job market has survived the 1967
Amendments. In Garrett v. Finch,3 the Sixth Circuit announced
its understanding of the rule:
Under a rule of this and other circuits, an applicant makes a prima facie case
by showing that he is unable to work at his usual occupation. The burden then
shifts to the secretary to produce evidence that will justify a finding that there
is available some other kind of "substantial gainful employment" applicant is
able to perform.23n
Substantial Evidence Rule
A crucial factor in judicial review of disability determinations is
225. Gentile v. Finch, 423 F.2d 244, 246-47 (3d Cir. 1970). Accord, Wright v. Gardner,
403 F.2d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 1968) (per curiam). See Martin v. Finch, 415 F.2d 793, 794-95 (5th
Cir. 1969); Mullins v. Gardner, 396 F.2d 139, 140 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
226. 430 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1970).
227. Id. at 324. Accord, Martin v. Finch, 415 F.2d 793, 794-95 (5th Cir. 1969); Mullins v.
Gardner, 396 F.2d 139, 140 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
228. 295 F. Supp. 1302 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
229. Id. at 1307.
230. 297 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. II1. 1969).
231. Id. at 747.
232. Id.
233. 436 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1970).
234. Id. at 18. Accord, Meneses v. Sec. of IEW, 442 F.2d 803, 806-07 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Gray v. Finch, 427 F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1971). See Gray v. Sec. of HEW, 421 F.2d 638,
639 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Miller v. Finch, 430 F.2d 321, 324 (8th Cir. 1970). Two circuits
left the question open. Gentile v. Finch, 423 F.2d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1970); Flake v. Gardner,
399 F.2d 532, 541 (9th Cir. 1968).
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the courts' interpretation of the substantial evidence rule, 3' inas-
much as liberal application of the rule may be used by the courts to
circumvent the effectiveness of the 1967 Amendments. The Supreme
Court has interpreted "substantial evidence" to mean "more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' 'ns Since the Su-
preme Court's definition of the rule is imprecise, courts can apply it
broadly or narrowly.23 The substantial evidence rule was liberally
applied by the Fourth Circuit in Flack v. Cohen,238 a disability deter-
mination, where the court relied upon the Supreme Court's opinion
in Universal Camera v. NLRB.239 The Supreme Court had said in
Universal Camera that a reviewing court may make a fair estimate
of the worth of the testimony of witnesses and use its informed judg-
ment on matters within its special competence .2  Drawing from this
rationale a mandate not to rubberstamp administrative findings, the
Fourth Circuit stated that a searching examination of the record must
be made to ascertain whether the decision is supported by substantial
evidence.241 This approach, although purporting to follow the sub-
stantial evidence rule, seems to go even further and indicates that the
reviewing court should reweigh the evidence as in a de novo hearing.
On the other hand, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits apply the rule
strictly.242 The Fifth Circuit states that the court may neither reweigh
the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the SSA; instead,
235. For a discussion of the rule, see 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.02
(1958). See also Cooper, Administrative Law: The "'Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J.
945 (1958); Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative
Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 22-26; Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law,
89 U. PA. L. REV. 1026 (1941); Comment, Administrative Law: Substantial Evidence on the
Record Considered As a Whole, 12 LA. L. REV. 290 (1952).
236. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). The Supreme Court
further clarified the definition in NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S.
292 (1939): "[Ilt must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict
when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." Id. at 299-300.
237. See 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 235, § 29.02, at 130. "Verbal formulas do not control the
intensity of judicial review. The scope of the court's inquiry may be broad or narrow, deep or
shallow, and still comply with the substantial-evidence formula." Id. § 29.02, at 1000 (1970
Stipp.).
238. 413 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1969).
239. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The companion cases were NLRB v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co.,
340 U.S. 498 (1951), and O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
240. 340 U.S. at 490.
241. 413 F.2d at 280.
242. See Brown v. Finch, 429 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Gardner, 401 F.2d 518
(8th Cir. 1968).
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the function of the trial and appellate courts is strictly limited to a
determination of whether there is substantial evidence in the record
to support the agency's decision.243 Since the strict approach is an
important method of minimizing the reversal rate of disability
determinations, the view of the Fifth Circuit should be uniformly
adopted.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Richardson v. Perales,2 1
the Court's first review of a disability case in years, does little to
clarify the substantial evidence rule because the question of its appli-
cation was not directly presented. Perales involved the issue of
whether written medical evidence, which was hearsay because not
given orally or subjected to cross-examination, could constitute sub-
stantial evidence and support an SSA denial of a claim. The district
court and the Fifth Circuit had found the evidence insufficient, 45 the
court of appeals noting (1) that the testimony of a medical adviser at
an examiner hearing was not substantial evidence, 4 and (2) that only
limited evidentiary weight should be given to the testimony of any
physician who has examined the claimant only once.24 7
The SSA naturally viewed these opinions as a basic attack on its
entire system of processing disability claims through two non-testi-
monial decisional stages in the state agencies and Baltimore and
through a predominantly non-testimonial examiner hearing in which
the claimant, the medical adviser, and the vocational consultant com-
ment on the prior non-testimonial record.2 14 Later the Fifth Circuit
243. Williams v. Finch, 440 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1971).
244. 402 U.S. 389 (1971). For a discussion of Perales, see Project, Federal Administrative
Law Developments-1971, 1972 DUKE L.J. 115, 174-82.
245. 412 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'g 288 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Tex. 1968).
246. 412 F.2d at 52-53.
247. Id. at 54-55.
248. That SSA's apprehensions were not unwarranted is indicated by the following quota-
tion from the report to Congress by the Commissioner of Social Security on the situation:
District courts have already cited the original Perales decision as authority to find that
consultative medical reports, standing alone, do not constitute substantial evidence; oral
testimony by consulting physicians does not constitute substantial evidence; oral testi-
mony by a medical advisor is not substantial evidence; oral testimony by a vocational
expert is not substantial evidence; unsigned hospital reports are hearsay and hence not
substantial evidence; and a claimant's self-serving testimony (without any supporting live
testimony) is sufficient to rebut written medical reports adverse to the claimant's claim.
Letter and Attachment from Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security, to
Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, and Russell B.
Long, Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance, April 7, 1970 (case citations omitted)
(copy on file with author).
This is apparently the only report in which SSA honored the 1967 request of Congress to
keep it informed on future trends ofjudicial interpretation. See H.R. Rep. No. 544, supra note
99, at 29-30.
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modified its Perales opinion by imposing precise conditions for a
claimant to successfully challenge the substantiality of such "relia-
ble" hearsay evidence: (1) the claimant must object to the hearsay
evidence, and (2) the claimant and a medical witness must appear and
testify in direct contradiction to the hearsay evidence.249 From this
modified ruling, which nonetheless would have entailed a major
change in SSA procedures, an appeal was taken, and the Supreme
Court reversed.2s0
The Supreme Court in Perales restored general record evidence
to the level of potential substantial evidence, noting that under exist-
ing regulations there were ample devices for a complainant to protect
himself by subpoenaing2' and cross-examining the reporting physi-
cian (which Perales had not done).2 2 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court included in its supporting rationale the pragmatic factors that
detailed medical reports based on accepted medical procedures are
of value5 3 and that in a nonadversary system handling thd claims
volume that SSA processes, to require the presence of medical ex-
perts for testimony in each case would substantially raise costs and
burden the medical profession without any likelihood of real benefit
to the claimant. 254 The Court briefly distinguished the Perales
249. 416 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1970).
250. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
251. The Secretary has the power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testi-
mony of witnesses and the production of evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) (1970). The claimant
himself may request the issuance of subpoenas. 20 C.F.R. § 404.926 (1971).
252. The Court held:
[A] written report by a licensed physician who has examined the claimant and who sets
forth in his report his medical findings in his area of competence may be received as
evidence in a disability hearing and, despite its hearsay character and an absence of
cross-examination, and despite the presence of opposing direct medical testimony and
testimony by the claimant himself, may constitute substantial evidence supportive of a
finding by a hearing examiner adverse to the claimant, when the claimant has not
exercised his right to subpoena the reporting physician and thereby provide himself with
the opportunity for cross-examination, of the physician. 402 U.S. at 402.
253. Id. at 403.
254. Id. at 406. The Court was impressed by the care and thoroughness of the medical
work-up. See id. at 403-04. Five specialists reported on Perales and agreed that this 34-year-
old ex-truck driver with a back problem was exaggerating, malingering, steeped in hostility,
and refusing to exercise or help himself. The five specialists, three of whom were government
consulting physicians, were a neurosurgeon, neurologist, orthopedist, psychiatrist and physical
medicine specialist. The medical adviser at the hearing supported these conclusions as did one
physician on whom Perales had relied for a welfare claim, the latter recommending that he
recondition himself and return to work. The only dissenting voice was the general practitioner
who had seen Perales over thirty times. The Court, relying on professionalism, refused to find
any bias on the part of the government-paid consulting physicians, id., and apparently no one
raised any question of bias on the part of the general practitioner.
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disability claim from the situation in Goldberg v. Kelly,"' a depen-
dent child welfare case which dealt with the termination of benefits
prior to a hearing and in which the credibility and veracity of medical
informants were in issue. The Court in Goldberg had held that before
termination of benefits there must be notice and opportunity for a
confrontation-type hearing. Perales, however, involved an initial
grant situation rather than a change of status without prior notice.
There was no problem of credibility and veracity of the physicians
but only a professional disagreement on medical conclusions.
Perales is an important decision, because it indicates the Supreme
Court's disposition, in light of the mass of cases to be processed, to
find that the SSA's limited type of hearing is consistent with proce-
dural due process if the claimant is given the opportunity to force
cross-examination. However, the decision leaves open the future de-
velopment of the substantial evidence rule. The Court expressly re-
manded the case for a substantial evidence determination by the
district court, but its detailed discussion of the medical reports seems
to leave little doubt as to the intended outcome. Was the Court's
review an abrogation or an honoring of the substantial evidence
rule-a de novo reweighing or simply an agreement with SSA that it
had substantial evidence for its conclusion?20
Concluding Observation
The degree to which the substantial evidence rule will be followed
by the courts may well be a function not of the rule itself but of the
degree of (1) judicial acceptance of the goals of the political branches
as embodied in the program; (2) the clarity of the statutory-
administrative standards; and (3) the precision in administrative pro-
cedures and operational criteria for applying the standards. If so,
despite the 1967 Amendments, the SSA disability program may fail
to command judicial credibility on point (1); defies credibility on
point (2); and may still be in trouble on point (3) because of its
interrelationship with point (2). Hence, the present degree of judicial
255. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
256. The short dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Bren-
nan, turns outwardly on a disposition to make cross-examination a rigid pre-condition of
"substantial evidence," whatever the nature or volume of the governmental program. And yet,
there are intimations that the dissenters might not feel bound by the substantial evidence rule.
Even though the physicians' reports were forthright, uncompromising and unanimous, Justice
Douglas refers to a "serious back injury," 402 U.S. at 411, as though it were a proven fact,
and speaks of a "grave injustice." Id. at 413.
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acceptance of the 1967 Amendments and the favorable Perales opin-
ion may be only a lull induced more by the magnitude of the program
and a sense of its administrative impossibilities than by an acceptance
of the program in principle.
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
All studies of the administrative process tend to emphasize prob-
lem areas and to project a somewhat negatively distorted impression
of any given program's fulfillment of its statutory mission. Thus,
viewed from the perspective of a million-claim intake,"' the SSA
disability system works. In fiscal year 1970, 6 percent (14,000) of
the total number of potentially reviewable SSA actions (238,000 sub-
stantive denials) and 45 percent of the denials actually appealed were
reversed by hearing examiners.21 It is a significant accomplishment
that approximately 88 percent of all claims eventually allowed can
be favorably disposed of at the initial determination-reconsideration
levels, without hearing examiner or court action.
In spite of these indicia of success, fundamental weaknesses re-
main. Because appeals in only a fraction of a million claims may
overload the system, some measure of finality at the earliest possible
decisional stage of the SSA disability process is desirable. Further-
more, the high rates of reversal at the various review stages actively
encourage claimants to appeal from denials of claims.
Proponents of extensive provisions for review typically argue that
equity requires giving a claimant ample opportunity to appeal to a
higher authority which can "correct" erroneous determinations made
at a lower level of the decisional process. However, an examination
of the extremely subjective disability standard and the equally subjec-
tive factors which are weighed when a disability determination is
made indicates that review and reversals of disability decisions often
produce merely different, rather than more accurate, results. In such
a situation, high reversal rates are not likely to contribute to the basic
"justice" of the system.29 Indeed, such rates may even imbalance the
257. See note 12 supra.
258. Bolton-Smith tabulation, supra note 74.
259. Reversals seem to be a complex of(l) the inherently amorphous nature of the abstract
capacity-for-gainful-activity standard when applied to claimants with some quantum of residual
work capacity; (2) the borderline fact situations in most of the cases which fall outside Test I
and Test II; (3) the difficulty in assessing psychological overlay in the borderline cases; (4) the
conclusory testimony of some medical advisers, which has telling effects; (5) the naturally
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system in favor of persistent claimants who yield to traumas, thereby
reinforcing the very kind of conduct society should seek to discour-
age.26 0
Perhaps the statutory abstract capacity-for-gainful-activity test2 ls
is the best legislative definition of total disability that can be drafted.
However, the test gives no indication of the amount of employment-
directed personal effort that society is to insist upon as a precondition
of subsidized premature retirement for the borderline claimants who
are only partially incapacitated. The problem is ultimately a public
policy question for lay determination, rather than a medical or psy-
chological/psychiatric issue. Nor is the problem readily susceptible
to significant clarification by the traditional common-law process
of reported, rationalized decisions and case-by-case construction
of precedent (unless one small unit could make all of the decisions
and thus institutionalize its own prejudices, following the model of
a regulatory commission).
Hardcore disability cases are relatively easy. But the borderline
cases which predominate at the appellate levels may involve informed
guesswork on a record weakest in evidence on the most important
factor-the spirit or motivation of the claimant. Moreover, psychol-
ogical/psychiatric data, even if more assiduously garnered, might
always be inconclusive, because any given set of data tends to support
opposite conclusions. Thus, in a borderline case, the response of the
appealing nature of the face-to-face contact, which first occurs at the hearing examiner level;
(6) the presence of an attorney who in any borderline case can always make a plausible
argument, and by his mere presence threatens further appeal; (7) the natural desire of an
appellate body to exercise its independence, which in the SSA context can only be accomplished
through ruling in favor of the claimant; (8) at the court level, judicial ignorance or simply
nonacceptance of the statutory standard of disability.
In defense of reversals, even at fairly high rates, the argument has been made that they are
beneficial, evidencing correction of poor work at lower levels. This point is undoubtedly valid
in part, and Justice Blackmun apparently took a similar view when he cited the 44.2% hearing
examiner reversal rate as attesting to "the fairness of the system." Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 410 (1971). But this hypothesis presents problems if it is extended too far. For
example, see notes 169-72 supra and accompanying text (data showing personal inconsistencies
among hearing examiners in their reversal rates).
260. This statement would not seem harsh to those who, like the author, have visited some
"borderline" case hearings and have seen the effect of complainant demeanor. For example,
in one case a disability allowance was denied to a claimant who, despite loss of one leg as a
child, had worked all his life in heavy construction. In another case, a disability allowance was
granted to an educated but ineffectual individual who had recovered from a physical illness and
whose basic problem seemed to be personal failure rather than incapacity for gainful employ-
ment in the strict statutory sense.
261. See notes 96-101 supra and accompanying text.
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first decisional body may be as accurate or reliable as the reaction
of any appellate body, provided the first decisional level operates in
the same fashion as the higher body-that is, in personal confronta-
tion with the claimant. The lack of face-to-face contact with the
claimant at the initial determination and reconsideration levels is a
serious obstacle to attributing more finality to the two basic deci-
sional stages and thus permitting reduction or elimination of much
of the hearing examiner and appellate structure.
Because only a fraction of the total denials even reach the hearing
examiner level, the question arises: Were the unreviewed decisions
"correct," or was there merely a differential in the vigor with which
the individuals asserted their claims? More significantly, the data
available on consistency among hearing examiners suggest that a
reversal may depend as much upon the personality of the examiner
as upon the actual record .1 2 Such reversals do not so much attest to
fairness as add a new element of inequity-the chance factor of case
assignment to a particular examiner. And again, the crucial factor
seems to be not bad faith but honest differences of opinion under the
vagaries of the abstract capacity-for-gainful-activity standard. 3
Historically, because standards are elusive and individual equity
is difficult to accomplish, the most problematic decision for welfare
or social insurance systems has been the disability determination.
Regarding SSA itself, there is evidence of sophisticated concern, a
spirit of self-study, a willingness to innovate, and a commendable
disposition to cooperate with outside research. But a positive attitude
seems to be of little avail if the SSA disability standards, due process-
inspired appeals, and the sheer magnitude of the claims load combine
to create administrative overburden and inherent problems of
decisional inconsistency in the borderline cases.
At the same time, we resist the Cassandra-like suggestion that
justice in the sense of consistency and correctness of decision is not
262. A significant cluster of examiners has reversed at the rate of 21-30%, while another
substantial group has had reversal rates of 66-80%. See note 170 supra and accompanying text.
263. At the initial determination and reconsideration stages there are also indications that
such borderline determinations are not uncommon. In evaluating the Nagi survey, see notes
138-58 supra and accompanying text, where the purpose was broader than a consistency check,
there is the nice question of which set of evaluations to "trust"-the regular BDI-state agency
determinations or the special clinical teams' evaluations. The answer may be'that both were
partially "correct" (or "incorrect"), because of the intrinsic difficulty of the total disability
concept, and that some variation both within and between the two sets of evaluating bodies
was predictable. However, even in what would seem to be non-borderline cases, there was an
observable divergence in the two sets of decisions. See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
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achievable where goals are sophisticated, standards are necessarily
vague, proof is difficult, and reasonable men may predictably differ
in close cases at rates approaching 50 percent. Yet to recognize this
conundrum is not to abandon the search for equity and efficiency in
mass claims systems. Instead, such recognition points to an insistence
that the best job possible be accomplished at the first stage where a
record hearing is feasible or mandated, and compels a corollary ins-
istence that appeals be rare and confined to correction of irrational-
ity.
Policy Making and Standards
The SSA disability program needs a more vigorous, centralized
policy-making machinery. Theoretically, the policy-making mecha-
nisms center in the Commissioner of SSA who exercises power dele-
gated by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. In practice,
SSA does not fit such a simple, centralized administrative model
because the cases move from the "independent" hearing examiners
and Appeals Council to court review without an intermediate, direct,
unifying review power in the Commissioner. Therefore, SSA does not
fit the quasi-judicial model of the regulatory commissions where the
top level, which is directly responsible to Congress and the President,
has power to review and modify individual case determinations and
thus to centralize policy-making 24 (although court review may fol-
low). To be sure, the Appeals Council functions as the top SSA
decisional level, but, except for the tie-breaking chairman, the Coun-
cil is composed of tenured civil servants who are not politically ac-
countable; moreover, its decisions are not reviewed by the Commis-
sioner who is accountable.
A response to this phenomenon would be to say that the function
of the Appeals Council is to apply the "law." But the question is,
what is the "law" in a system with few regulations and an amorphous
statutory standard which is to serve as the basis for all difficult deter-
minations? An additional adverse impact on centralization of policy-
making may flow from the geographic separation and the resultant
conceptual bifurcation of the SSA effort between the two-level initial
264. See Jones, The Role of Administrative Agencies as Instruments of Social Reform, 19
AD. LAW REv. 279, 287-89 (1967). Cf Loevinger, The Administrative Agency As a Paradigm
of Government-A Survey of the Administrative Process, 40 IND. L.J. 287, 305-07 (1965). See
also Comment, Administrative Agencies, the Public Interest, and National Policy: Is a Mar-
riage Possible?, 59 GEo. L.J. 420 (1970).
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determination-reconsideration process centralized in Baltimore and
the hearing examiner process headquartered in Arlington, Virginia
(with examiners themselves operating locally around the country).
Some SSA-Baltimore guidelines, the most important being those
relating to presumptions, are not honored in Arlington.6 5
Rulemaking is the normal process by which broad administrative
discretion is clarified and channeled in the light of experience under
statutes which may do little more than identify a goal. 6 The problem
of decisional inconsistencies in SSA could be eased if more detailed
substantive regulations for disability determinations were issued by
the Secretary of HEW, or the Commissioner of SSA as his delegate,
for the uniform guidance of the state agencies, SSA-Baltimore deter-
miners, hearing examiners and Appeals Council, and the courts. Al-
though SSA has commendably formulated detailed guidelines which
provide for allowance of many hardcore claims on objective medical
grounds,6 7 very few standards for decision in the more difficult ab-
stract capacity-for-gainful-activity cases have been articulated.2 6 One
possibly promising approach, if Congress were to acquiesce, would
be to experiment further with objective concepts of an age-
occupational-disability nature .2 Another possibility would be to ex-
pand the concept of "medical equivalance" of a listed impairment
under Test IY °
Although revision of the abstract statutory definition of disability
would encounter resistance and should be a last recourse, difficulties
caused by the statute cannot be ignored. Statutory revisions which
might compel the creation of clearer standards include: (1) explicit
statutory direction for SSA to make and enforce more detailed per
se rules of disability; (2) clarification of the presumption to apply in
close cases; (3) confinement of SSA disability to a wholly objective
series of tightly drawn measures of physical incapacity and reliance
on other federal programs to take care of needs in the present
difficult border-line claims area; (4) removal of confidentiality
265. See notes 120-24 supra and accompanying text.
266. See generally 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6.01-.12 (1958);
id. §§ 6.0 1-.10 (Supp. 1970).
267. See notes 104-10 supra and accompanying text (Test I evaluations).
268. The present regulations do not insure that SSA determiners and hearing examiners
will follow the same presumption in Test III cases. See notes 119-25 supra and accompanying
text.
269. Test II, as applied to certain categories of manual laborers, exempliiies this approach.
See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
270. See notes 104-10 supra and accompanying text.
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from SSA cases and publication of Appeals Council substantive
decisions.
The SSA Administrative Process
Given the present claims volume, the SSA disability program
requires an expeditious "flush" process which will insure the prompt
denial of technically insufficient or frivolous applications and the
ready allowance of obvious hardcore disability claims. The state
agencies and SSA-Baltimore (BDI) perform this function relatively
well in the initial determination and reconsideration stages without
personally confronting the claimant. Face-to-face contact seems nec-
essary, however, for a well-reasoned, equitable decision in the border-
line cases. Lack of such contact at the first decisional levels may be
one inducement to appeal to the hearing examiner level, and personal
contact at that level seems to be an element in the high reversal
rate.2 ' Therefore, consideration should be given to providing per-
sonal confrontation prior to the hearing examiner level.
Using the state agency teams, SSA is now experimenting with
face-to-face claimant contact at the reconsideration level. However,
absent the grant of some measure of final decisional power to the
state agencies, the state "hearing" would merely be an interview and
would not accomplish the goals of direct personal impact by the
claimant on the decisional process, increased "client" satisfaction,
and decreased incentive to appeal. If a determinative state agency
hearing were held, a continued Baltimore power to remand or reverse
a decision without a hearing would be inappropriate from the stand-
point of these goals. But if the Baltimore operation were thus dis-
placed, major regional inconsistencies among state agencies might
arise because of the vagueness of the disability standards.
Decentralization of the SSA-Baltimore reconsideration stage, al-
though requiring a major structural and personnel upheaval, is a
potentially promising alternative. A wholly federal reconsideration
stage would increase the uniformity of decision, and a decentralized
staff would provide the needed face-to-face claimant contact.2Y2 Staff
decentralization could be accomplished by creating permanent local
substations in each state or by using roving teams of reconsideration
personnel rotating on a regular schedule (the latter being prefera-
271. See text following note 124 supra.
272. If the state agency role is to be preserved in deference to a corollary vocational
rehabilitation purpose, a state role at the initial determination level should suffice.
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ble in order to maintain uniformity and avoid regional differentials).
Some replaced state expert personnel could be absorbed as part of
the reconsideration staff expansion which might be needed. The
federalized reconsideration panel could be composed of a physician
and a vocational disability evaluator, who would supply technical
expertise, and a lawyer, who would aid in structuring decisions and
constructing a reviewable record. The increased initial workload
resulting from personal hearings by a multi-member federal panel
at the reconsideration level might be reduced by introducing a
screening process whereby allowances could be made without a
hearing.
If the suggestion to reconstitute the reconsideration stage as the
basic personal hearing level has merit, retention of the hearing exam-
iner stage, where personal confrontation first occurs under present
procedures, would be redundant. The hearing examiner stage could
be deleted entirely or, alternatively, could be fused with the proposed
federalized reconsideration stage.273 The hearing examiner could
serve as presiding and deciding officer, and other members of the
multi-disciplinary panel might function as advisers. To go beyond
this and incorporate the "independent" SSA hearing examiner as
the presiding but co-equal member of multi-disciplinary recon-
sideration panels would require amendment of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
Concededly, such a drastic reassessment of the SSA hearing
examiner function gets into an area where there is a sharp clash of
273. The other extreme would be to completely divorce the decision-making process and
the hearing examiner function, and to develop a "pure" administrative judge model. Logical
corollary features of following the pure adjudicatory model would be:
(a) use of an adversary process with an SSA spokesman present at the hearing to present
the agency position;
(b) termination of the "open file" concept and use of remands for the consideration of
new evidence and the revision of the administrative position;
(c) termination of the principle of confidentiality, because such a principle hinders the
development of precedent in the process of adjudication.
Following the "administrative judge" model would force serious consideration of the issue
of hearing examiner independence in relation to the Appeals Council and in relation to Bureau
of Hearings and Appeals administrative control. The subject has already been the source of
controversy. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
As a third alternative, the system could remain substantially as it is at present, but with a
concerted effort by SSA to clarify the law by issuing more detailed regulations and by publiciz-
ing more precedential decisions, "sanitized" by the Appeals Council to preserve confidentiality.
Fourth, there could be an attempt to work out a fresh accommodation between the position
which indicates a more constricted hearing examiner role and the one which points toward
increased examiner independence.
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principles and deep disagreement. However, even under present
procedures the SSA hearing examiner role is somewhat unusual.
Formal rules of evidence are not used, and the proceeding is non-
adversary. Furthermore, not all hearing examiner reversals of prior
SSA administrative denials are substantive adjudications-some
result from introduction of new evidence or from a change in the
claimant's physical condition so that the hearing examiner is actually
perfecting an incomplete administrative process.
Replacement of the hearing examiner level by a federal reconsi-
deration hearing would pose questions concerning the minimum
amount of formality which would be required for a proper hearing.
Under present interpretations of the Social Security Act and the
Administrative Procedure Act, disability hearings under the direction
of a Civil Service Commission-certified hearing examiner are re-
quired to build a record for review.27 4 More critical is the question of
the degree of formality constitutionally required.
Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court indicate that a cau-
tious judicial reassessment of the due process-formality requirements
in high volume benefit determinations may be underway. Goldberg
v. Kelly275 involved a challenge to a state termination of an award
under the federally-supported aid-to-dependent-children program
which provided for a post-termination "fair hearing"-in other
words, a formal, quasi-judicial trial. The Supreme Court held that
while there must also be a pre-termination evidentiary hearing satis-
fying "minimum procedural safeguards," adapted to the "limited
nature of the controversies to be resolved," the proceeding need not
take the form of a "quasi-judicial trial" or the "statutory 'fair
hearing.' "271 However, Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, then
proceeded to describe in quite formal terms the kind of pre-
termination hearing contemplated. 7
274. The Social Security Act provisions for a hearing and findings, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b),
(g) (1970), read in combination with the Administrative Procedure Act provisions regarding
who can hold such a hearing, 5 U.S.C. § 556-57, 3105 (1970), are deemed to require use of
hearing examiners certified by the Civil Service Commission. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.921 (1971).
275. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
276. Id. at 266-67.
277. Although a transcript and specific findings apparently are not required, there must be
notice, personal appearance, right of counsel, and cross-examination. The decision maker must
be impartial and his conclusions as to eligibility must rest on the legal rules and the evidence
received at the hearing. He should relate the reasons for his decision to the evidence in the
record. Id. at 267-71.
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In Richardson v. Wright,278 the SSA had terminated, because of
a subsequent work record, a disability award under procedures
which allowed suspension of benefits before a full investigation and
hearing were conducted. The claimants argued a right to a pre-
termination hearing under Goldberg and won a partial victory in the
district court,2  which apparently relied more on the Supreme
Court's "minimum procedural safegutards" language than the sur-
prisingly detailed description of that term. The court said that the
claimant had a right to have timely notice, to examine the documen-
tary evidence supporting termination, and to submit counter-
evidence, but saw no necessity for a formal hearing where medical
personnel or employers would be required to be present for cross-
examination.8 0
The Supreme Court remanded the case for redetermination in the
light of intervening, revised SSA provisions which govern disability
benefit termination proceedings and follow the district court's limited
reading of Goldberg in providing for written submissions rather than
oral testimony or confrontation of witnesses. 2 l The Court said that
if the claimant won back his award under the new procedure there
would be no need to consider his constitutional claim.2 2 Thus, the
Supreme Court's remand in Wright, despite the technical ground on
which it was placed, raises the possibility that the Court may be
moving toward an even more limited reading of Goldberg than was
made in the district court. The Court's comment that "[i]n the con-
text of a comprehensive complex administrative program, the admin-
istrative process must have a reasonable opportunity to evolve proce-
dures to meet needs as they arise" 23 further indicates that at the
proposed federalized reconsideration level,214 what is termed in
Goldberg a detailed "evidentiary hearing," without formal rules of
evidence, a transcript, or formal findings, might suffice as a basis for
278. 405 U.S. 208 (1972).
279. 321 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1971).
280. Id. at 387.
281. See DISABILITY INSURANCE STATE MANUAL § 265.1D.
282. 405 U.S. at 209. Justice Brennan in dissent noted that the new provisions do not
expressly reflect the district court's additional comment that resolution of conflicting evidence
furnished by the claimant should be by an impartial decision maker and that a hearing "could
be" held on the conflict. Id. at 213-14.
283. Id. at 209.
284. See notes 272-74 supra and accompanying text.
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both administrative and judicial review.285
CONCLUSION
The SSA experience strongly suggests the inadvisability of build-
ing high-level, Administrative Procedure Act-type hearing and appeal
procedures into benefit or "social insurance" systems which yield a
mass of claims to be disposed of under discretionary eligibility stan-
dards more subjective than such simple criteria as age, length of
service, or strictly objective medical criteria. As we move further into
the welfare state, defined broadly to include discretionary social in-
surance of the disability claim type, we may have to reevaluate at a
very basic level the tensions caused by the interface of ever more
absolute due process concepts and ever more mountainous claims
loads under vague standards and intractable problems of proof.*
285. The questions remain, of course, as to whether the Court would require the same level
of formality for initially processing claims as for terminating a benefit already awarded, and
the extent to which the level of formality may vary with either the character of the administra-
tive program or the degree of intrinsic objectivity and reliability in the relevant evidence.
* Editor's Note: At the time of publication, the Civil Service Commission had recently
changed the title "hearing examiner" in all federal agencies, including SSA, to "administrative
law judge." 37 Fed. Reg. 16787 (1972). However, the "traditional" term of "hearing examiner"
has been used throughout this article.
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